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Abstract
This paper welcomes the fact that the discussion about the labour market and small 
business has broadened in scope. It considers some of the suggestions made by 
Cheadle (2006) in his recent concept paper. These include dismissals, unfair labour 
practices, appointments and promotions and collective bargaining. It also suggests that 
other changes to our labour laws are necessary, including the need for a doctrine of 
equal pay for equivalent work, the regulation of labour broker arrangements and other 
atypical employees, and the manner in which terms and conditions of employment can 
be amended. Besides legislative amendments it argues against the demise of the Labour 
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 1. Introduction 
Cheadle’s concept paper (Cheadle, 2006) is not only thought provoking, but his 
submissions also get to the heart of the debate. Therefore, although this paper is not 
intended as a direct response to his paper, I refer frequently to his submissions.1 I also set 
out a number of other issues that I believe should be considered. 
Clearly what started out as a discussion about the labour market and small business 
has broadened in scope. This is correct because the problems facing small business 
cannot be solved without affecting the labour market as a whole. There is often a roll-on 
effect; for example, exemptions for small business from bargaining council agreements 
might dramatically affect the representivity of bargaining councils, and therefore threaten 
sectoral collective bargaining. We should, I believe, be cautious about agreeing to 
changes that may alter the fundamentals of our labour market regulations, which are, I 
believe, sound, when tinkering with certain areas, as we may affect the balance that has 
been painstakingly negotiated by the social partners. 
We should also recognise that many of the problems facing small business and their 
employees are the same problems that employers and workers at medium and large 
HQWHUSULVHVIDFH,QDGGLWLRQWKHUHDUHDOVRVSHFL¿FNLQGVRIZRUNHUVWKDWDUHYXOQHUDEOH
and deserving of greater protection. It is, therefore, not possible to deal with small 
business in isolation of the broader regulation of the labour market. 
At the same time, it would be foolhardy to think that changes to the labour laws alone 
will solve all the problems. The reason for this is that many of the problems do not lie 
with the nature of the laws, but rather with the way in which they are implemented or not 
implemented. A comprehensive programme beyond legislative reform is necessary. These 
areas include: the competence and training of labour law practitioners and managers 
generally; the administration of our dispute resolution institutions; and, the training of 
arbitrators and judges. 
However, one point raised by Cheadle in relation to devising labour market legislation 
warrants repetition, and that is that when formulating legislation we tend to approach the 
problem as if we are dealing with the typical employer and the typical employee. In so 
doing, we forget that the legislation must embrace many types of employers and workers 
1 All references to Cheadle, except where so stated, are to his 2006 concept paper.  
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and different kinds of work, levels of employees and relationships. We need to approach 
the problem bearing in mind the diversity of employers and employees.
 2. Summary
 2.1 Dismissals for Misconduct and Incapacity
The problem is not the law, but how it is applied. The Code of Practice must be revised. It 
should explicitly deal with the procedures required of small businesses. The process and 
speed with which Codes are adopted and amended at NEDLAC needs to be addressed.
 2.2 Dismissals for Operational Requirements
I discuss the nature of the employers and workers interests and analyse the balance 
VWUXFNLQWKHOHJLVODWLRQ,WUDFHWKHGLI¿FXOW\WKDWWKHFRXUWVKDYHKDGLQGHWHUPLQLQJDWHVW
for the substantive fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements and to what extent 
the courts are willing to second-guess the employer’s operational decision. I discuss the 
new s 189A and the problems with that section. 
Sections 189 and 189A should be reworked so that all employees have the choice 
whether to strike about the operational decision or refer a dispute about the substantive 
fairness of the dismissals to court for adjudication. However, if it were referred to court, 
then a lesser test for substantive fairness should apply, as is presently encapsulated in s 
189A(19) of the LRA. This would be in the interests of small business.
The Code of Practice on Dismissals for Operational Requirements, which is not useful, 
should be redrafted. It should include a section on the applicable procedure required of 
small business employers. 
An Exploratory Look into Labour Market Regulation               Anton Roskam
              3
 2.3 Probation and Newly Hired Employees
I trace the history of this issue during the negotiations that led to the 2002 LRA 
amendments.
There are questions about whether a qualifying period without protections against unfair 
dismissal will be constitutional. 
I discuss workers’ fears about this period, which includes the proliferation of short-term 
contracts, especially for non-skilled jobs. 
In the light of the international trends on this issue, and assuming that a deal can be 
worked out, I suggest that it should include appropriate regulations that discourage the 
kinds of problems referred to above, adequately protect newly hired employees from 
discrimination, victimisation and at least guarantee some degree of substantive fairness 
IRUH[DPSOHWKHGLVPLVVDOPXVWDWOHDVWEHMXVWL¿DEOHRQUDWLRQDOJURXQGV
 2.4 Recruitment and Hiring
I align myself with Cheadle’s comments about selection decisions, except my comments 
about probation. I endorse his views about the need for a remedy requiring an employer 
to hire an applicant for employment who was refused employment because of her trade 
XQLRQDI¿OLDWLRQRUDFWLYLWLHV
 2.5 Unfair Labour Practices
Based on the CCMA statistics, I raise a question about whether the residual unfair labour 
practice is a major cause of rigidity in the labour market.
I question whether it is appropriate to leave the regulation of all labour practices contained 
in s 186(2) of the LRA to collective bargaining. 
If a labour practice were to be regulated, then, in the interests of certainty, it would be 
EHWWHU IRU WKH ODZWREHVSHFL¿FUDWKHU WKDQEURDG)RUH[DPSOH LW LVEHWWHU WRUHJXODWH
suspension more fully, than simply provide that the employer may not act unfairly in 
relation to suspensions. 
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Promotions
Employers and trade unions should be encouraged to regulate their own promotion 
policies and procedures. However, in the absence of an agreement, employees should 
not be left without a remedy to challenge unfair conduct by the employer. This is because 
SURPRWLRQVDUHHPRWLRQDODQGGLI¿FXOWLVVXHVLQPDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGSURPRWLRQDOEHLW
a species of appointment, concerns an employee’s career path.
Demotion
,DJUHHZLWK&KHDGOH¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVEXW UDLVH WZRFRQFHUQV7KH¿UVW UHODWHV WR
the effective processing of demotion disputes in the CCMA. The second relates to 
the situation where consent to a demotion may be inferred from a disciplinary code or 
procedure that has the status of a collective agreement i.e. where the consent is obtained 
before the verdict and sanction of the disciplinary hearing is provided. 
%HQH¿WV
I have concerns about the scrapping of this unfair labour practice without an adequate 
statutory alternative. Collective bargaining will not always be a satisfactory mechanism to 
UHVROYHGLVSXWHVDERXWEHQH¿WV7KHH[DPSOHXVHGWRLOOXVWUDWHWKLVSRLQWLVWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
LQFRQVLVWHQWDQGXQIDLUSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVWRHPSOR\HHVZKHUHWKHUH LVQRDJUHHPHQW
requiring fairness and no discrimination on a listed or analogous ground. 
Discipline Short of Dismissal
If this unfair labour practice were deleted, one of the advantages to employees would be 
that employers could not argue at the subsequent dismissal hearing that the employee 
acquiesced to a previous disciplinary sanction that was short of dismissal because she 
never referred an unfair labour practice dispute. 
+RZHYHU LI LWZHUHGHOHWHGWKHUHDUH WKUHHSRWHQWLDOSUREOHPV7KH¿UVW LV WKDWZLWKRXW
this provision or a collective agreement, there is no statutory obligation on the employer 
to accord employees a fair procedure (i.e. the right to be heard) before imposing a 
disciplinary sanction short of dismissal. 
The second relates to a situation where an employee is not promoted because she has a 
ZDUQLQJRQKHU¿OH,IERWKXQIDLUODERXUSUDFWLFHVUHODWLQJWRSURPRWLRQDQGGLVFLSOLQHZHUH
deleted, the employee may be without a remedy to resolve her grievance. 
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The third concern relates to the fact that disciplinary warnings often mean that an 
employee does not get a bonus or a notch increase. It is not clear if an employee would 
be without a remedy to challenge this in certain circumstances.
Suspension
I agree with Cheadle’s comments and emphasise the widespread abuse of suspension, 
particularly in the public service. 
Transfers
In the absence of collective agreements regulating this matter a statute should regulate 
the employer’s conduct relating to transfers. 
 2.6 Equal Pay for Equivalent Work
It is necessary to introduce a doctrine of equal pay for equivalent work to cover situations 
ZKHUHWKHUHLVLQFRQVLVWHQWDQGDUELWUDU\UHPXQHUDWLRQRUSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVWRZRUNHUV
and there is no unfair discrimination based upon one of the listed or analogous grounds. 
Collective bargaining is not always the appropriate mechanism for resolving these 
disputes.
 2.7 Challenges Facing Dispute Resolution Institutions
A comprehensive analysis of the problems associated with dispute resolution at bargaining 
councils is necessary. 
There are numerous problems associated with the Labour Court. Many are administrative. 
The Superior Courts Bill will not necessarily resolve all of them. The rules of the 
Labour Court must be looked at urgently. The Superior Courts Bill should maintain the 
Labour Court as a specialist court, even if it is a division of the High Court, and it must 
KDYHQDWLRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ7KH%LOOPXVWDOORZRI¿FLDOVRI WUDGHXQLRQVDQGHPSOR\HUV¶
RUJDQLVDWLRQWKHULJKWWRUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ7KHLVVXHRIMXGJHVEHLQJTXDOL¿HGWRDGMXGLFDWH
complex labour disputes after attending a short course at the judge’s college is cause for 
concern.
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$WKRURXJK LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR WKH IXQFWLRQLQJDQGHI¿FDF\RI WKH&&0$LVUHTXLUHG:H
need to encourage well-organised sectors, such as retail, to establish councils, and not 
rely upon the CCMA for all their dispute resolution functions. The CCMA should also 
accredit private dispute resolution agencies. 
 2.8 Labour Brokers
I discuss the effect of labour broking arrangements upon workers, particularly when 
it comes to dismissal. I recommend that the client, and not the broker, be made the 
employer of the worker, if the worker has been placed with the client for more than three 
months. Alternatively, I recommend that the client’s liability be extended, particularly when 
it comes to dismissal. Lastly, I recommend that labour brokers be required to register with 
the Department of Labour and that they be regulated through that process. 
 2.9 Other Atypical Workers
In order to deal with the problems of casualisation I recommend that:
§ Minimum amounts of pay and rates of pay are set for temporary 
workers through the extension of sectoral collective agreements 
or the issuing of sectoral determinations. Sectoral determinations 
may be necessary even where there is a sectoral bargaining 
council because of the limited capacity of bargaining councils 
WRGHDOZLWKPDWWHUVRI WKLVQDWXUH&DVXDOVDUHYHU\GLI¿FXOW WR
organise.
§ 7HPSRUDU\HPSOR\HHVHDUQLQJEHORZDVSHFL¿HGWKUHVKROGVKRXOG
KDYHWKHLU WHPSRUDU\LH¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWV WUDQVIRUPHGLQWR
permanent contracts (contracts of indefinite duration), if the 
temporary contract is renewed three times or after one year.
§ Employers should only be allowed to use temporary workers in 
VSHFL¿HGVLWXDWLRQVVXFKDVDWHPSRUDU\ LQFUHDVHLQWKHDPRXQW
of work.
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 2.10 Application of Labour Legislation to Workers
I recommend that dependent contractors, like owner-drivers, be afforded the protections 
RIODERXUUHODWHGVWDWXWHVLQWHUPVRIVRIWKH%&($DOWHUQDWLYHO\WKDWWKHGH¿QLWLRQRI
employee be amended to include dependent contractors.
,DUJXHWKDW LQ WKH LQWHUHVWVRIÀH[LELOLW\VHQLRUH[HFXWLYHV LQFOXGLQJVHQLRUJRYHUQPHQW
RI¿FLDOVVKRXOGEHH[FOXGHGIURPWKHDPELWRI ODERXU OHJLVODWLRQ ,EHOLHYHWKDW WKH\DUH
adequately covered by the common law of contract. 
 2.11 Collective Bargaining
I agree with Cheadle’s recommendations to the effect that:
§ Given the fragmentary nature of bargaining councils the 
Department of Labour should promptly facilitate a process for the 
establishment and consolidation of bargaining councils.
§ NEDLAC should urgently demarcate the sectors. 
§ Bargaining councils should be empowered through subsidies 
DQGRWKHUPHDQVWRIXO¿OWKHLUIXQFWLRQVEH\RQGVHWWLQJWHUPVDQG
conditions of employment. These include setting sectoral policies, 
providing industrial support services, etc.
I explain some of labour’s reasons for not agreeing to the Minister having the power to 
vary basic terms and conditions of employment downwards and suggest that, if there 
DUHVSHFL¿FSURSRVDOVIRUGRZQZDUGYDULDWLRQZLWKUHJDUGWRDVHFWRUWKRVHEHWDEOHGIRU
discussion.
I discuss the nature of sectoral agreements and the setting of actuals as opposed to 
minima.
Extension of Collective Agreements
Cheadle proposes that the Minister be given the power to refuse to extend a bargaining 
FRXQFLOFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQW LI LWFRQÀLFWVZLWK WKHFRXQWU\¶V ODERXUPDUNHWSROLF\+H
proposes two protections against abuse: the negotiation of the labour market policy 
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at NEDLAC and the constitutional right of review. I discuss the inadequacy of these 
protections.
Collective Bargaining and Small Business
There is no need to provide for further exemptions for small businesses from collective 
agreements that are extended by the Minister. This is so because at present the 
bargaining council system covers small businesses fairly, the exemption system is 
ZRUNLQJHI¿FLHQWO\DQGDEODQNHWH[HPSWLRQZRXOGVHULRXVO\XQGHUPLQHDQDOUHDG\IUDJLOH
bargaining council system. However, mechanisms for ensuring greater participation and 
representation of small businesses in bargaining councils are proposed. 
 2.12 Amending Terms of Conditions of Employment
In order to protect the sanctity of collective bargaining and in light of the Fry’s Metals case, 
an amendment to s 187(1)(c) of the LRA is essential. An amendment is proposed. 
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 3. The Context
The problem with concept papers is that it is easy to drift off into academic discussion 
about neat and clean legal solutions to labour market regulation. It is therefore important 
to constantly bear in mind both the constitutional and socio-economic contexts. 
 3.1 The Constitutional Context
Cheadle (2006) has effectively dealt with the constitutional context in his draft paper. 
It is, however, perhaps worth remembering that only a law of general application can 
limit the rights contained in our Bill of Rights, and it can do so only to the extent that 
WKH OLPLWDWLRQ LVUHDVRQDEOHDQG MXVWL¿DEOH LQDQRSHQDQGGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\EDVHGRQ
human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account the factors listed in s 36(1) of 
the Constitution. Naturally, there are always debates about how these rights should be 
EDODQFHG+RZDUHWKH LQWHUHVWVRIVRFDOOHGSURJUHVVDQG LPSURYLQJWKHHI¿FLHQFLHVRI
the employer’s business balanced with the interests of employees for job security and 
decent employment?
The constitution is not entirely silent on the question of this balance. At its core it 
recognises the right to human dignity. This means that we are enjoined to protect and 
promote the interests of the vulnerable, powerless and disadvantaged, whose dignity in 
this country is under relentless attack from the adverse socio-economic conditions that 
they endure. 
3.2 The Socio-Economic Context
The socio-economic context is equally important. I do not intend to delve into it in any 
depth because that would be beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is important to 
highlight a number of issues. 
7KHUHLVQRQHHGWRGHEDWHH[DFWO\ZKDWWKHXQHPSOR\PHQW¿JXUHLVH[FHSWWRQRWHWKDW
for a country of our nature and size it is tremendous. Particularly for the unskilled or semi-
skilled worker and her family and other dependents, many of whom are unemployed, 
dismissal for whatever reason is a ghastly sentence. In addition, the limited welfare 
support for the unemployed is little consolation. Job security for the unskilled and semi-
skilled in South Africa, with its extreme levels of poverty, is often a matter of survival. 
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It is, therefore, no wonder why workers who fear the terror of the unemployment queue 
mandate their organisations to vigorously resist changes to dismissal law that would 
make it easier for them to be dismissed. It is also understandable why workers and 
WKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQVJUHHWFDOOV IRUPRUHÀH[LELOLW\ WRWKH ODZRIGLVPLVVDOZLWKVXFKJUDYH
suspicion, especially when they are motivated by such crude sound bites as “if we 
could dismiss you more easily, we would hire more people”. (Of course, the importance 
of job security is not as acute for all grades or types of employees. In the light of the 
skills shortages in certain areas of our economy the effect of a dismissal may not be 
economically devastating for some employees.)
Economic growth has been steadily increasing, but remains below the annual target of 6 
per cent. It is questionable to what extent that growth has translated into an increase in 
the number of jobs, particularly full-time, decent and sustainable jobs. 
The quality and nature of the jobs that are and have been created is cause for concern. 
Casualisation is more and more prevalent. This means that increasingly jobs are 
temporary in nature. Frequently, these jobs are for a few hours on some days. These 
workers work for wages well below the poverty line; they have no access to medical aid 
DQGUHWLUHPHQW IXQGVFKHPHV WKH\DUHGLI¿FXOW WRRUJDQLVHDQG LW LVGLI¿FXOW WRPRQLWRU
DQGHQIRUFHGHFHQWFRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQW2WKHUHPSOR\HHVDUHVWUXFWXUDOO\GH¿QHG
out of the protections of labour market regulation and become so-called independent 
contractors. They are thus without the legal protections created by statutes such as the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) and Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 (BCEA). 
Besides the high unemployment rate and lack of job creation it is evident that our 
country has large disparities between the incomes of the rich and the poor, and that such 
inequalities are growing and are above the international average. As wages are primarily 
determined through collective bargaining it is imperative that any change to the regulation 
of collective bargaining has the effect of strengthening that process rather than weakening 
it.
The levels and extent of poverty are not only unacceptable from a moral point of view, 
but for those more concerned about advancing their bottom lines, poverty represents a 
real risk to economic stability and growth in this country. The need for social justice is not 
only morally necessary, but in the long-term interests of all South Africans, including the 
wealthy. 
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At the same time, we cannot forget that as a country we need to be competitive on 
the international stage. Our country must continue to attract foreign investment. It is 
necessary to project to the world that a potential investor’s money will be securely and 
SUR¿WDEO\ZHOO ORRNHGDIWHULQWKLVFRXQWU\ZKLFKLVGRQHE\DPRQJVWPDQ\RWKHUWKLQJV
H[SODLQLQJWKDW WKHUHJXODWLRQRIRXU ODERXUPDUNHWUHÀHFWVWKHFRUUHFWEDODQFHEHWZHHQ
the needs for economic progress and social justice.
When it comes to the international stage, we are constantly reminded of the 
competitiveness of countries such as China. We must consider these issues carefully. 
These matters require a comprehensive comparison and analysis of all issues relating 
to international and local governance. It is not apparent that the undermining of labour 
standards will be economically beneficial to all South Africans, particularly the poor. 
Moreover, we cannot simply compare the wages of workers in South Africa and China, 
and then deduce that workers in our country are earning too much. Comparisons must 
be made precisely and should include the social wage provided by the State, which 
in this country is low. Once that is done, we must ask ourselves the moral question of 
whether we want any of our people to be subjected to the appalling working conditions 
that Chinese workers experience. Do we, for example, agree that a clothing worker with 
numerous dependents should earn less than R300 per week or that she should have only 
a few weeks’ maternity leave?  I very much doubt that anyone with a moral conscience 
FDQDQVZHULQWKHDI¿UPDWLYH
It is also important to note that many East Asian countries do not simply undermine labour 
standards, but instead they ensure substantial career mobility and excellent job security in 
their formal companies, and invest heavily in skills.
In light of the above, there is a clear need for greater social justice in this country. 
Unfortunately, the need for greater social justice is not uppermost in many people’s 
minds when they call for changes to the laws regulating the labour market. Usually these 
calls are made to ensure that employers can more easily reap greater economic reward. 
Coupled to this is often the professed assumption that greater economic reward for 
employers will inevitably result in more social justice. Workers and trade unions are 
MXVWL¿DEO\VFHSWLFDORI WKHDVVXPSWLRQV LQKHUHQW LQ WKLV OLQHRIUHDVRQLQJDQGVXVSLFLRXV
that arguments of this nature are merely a ruse for tilting the balance in favour of 
employers at the expense of workers. 
We should recognise that the discourse about labour market legislation in the public 
PHGLD LVFUXGH IUHTXHQWO\SLFNLQJXSRQHOLQHUV WKDW UHÀHFW WKHYLHZVRI WKRVHZKRVH
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interest is not social justice and greater human dignity. The chant for greater labour 
PDUNHWÀH[LELOLW\ LV ORXGDQGUHSHWLWLYH LWGURZQVRXW WKHGHPDQGVIRU MREVHFXULW\7KH
public discourse does not adequately understand the need for and complexity of the 
balance between economic growth and social justice. 
0RUHRYHUPDQ\RI WKHSURQRXQFHPHQWVDERXW WKH LQÀH[LELOLW\RIRXU ODERXUPDUNHWDUH
based upon surveys of the perceptions of human resource practitioners or lawyers such 
as estimates of how much time it takes them to resolve the disputes (Bisseker, 2005). 
7KHVHDUHKDUGO\VFLHQWL¿FDQG WKH LQIRUPDWLRQJDWKHUHGGRHVQRWSURYH LQÀH[LELOLW\ ,W
might show managerial incompetence in many cases or incompetence on the part of 
DGMXGLFDWRUV ,QIDFW ,EHOLHYHWKDWPDQ\RI WKHVRFDOOHG LOOVRIRXU ODERXUPDUNHWUHÀHFW
the ignorance or lack of skill of many of our managers. It is always easier to blame 
the system than admit one’s own faults. It is also easier for a manager to blame the 
system than have to admit her reluctance to confront an under-performing or recalcitrant 
employee.
Therefore, what we need to do is to evaluate our labour market legislation pragmatically 
E\DVNLQJWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU LW UHÀHFWV WKHFRUUHFWDQGDSSURSULDWHEDODQFHEHWZHHQ
WKHQHHGVIRUHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGVRFLDOMXVWLFH7KHTXHVWLRQLVQRWZKHWKHULWLVÀH[LEOH
RULQÀH[LEOHEXWUDWKHUZKHWKHULWFUHDWHVWKHDSSURSULDWHEDODQFH
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 4. Dismissals for Misconduct and Incapacity
I align myself with Cheadle’s comments about dismissals for misconduct and incapacity. I 
therefore make the following points by way of addition. 
The problem here is not really the law, but how adjudicators, labour law practitioners, 
employers and employees apply it. It seems to me that the Code of Good Practice on 
'LVPLVVDOVIRU0LVFRQGXFWDQG,QFDSDFLW\KDVSURYHGWREHDQLQVXI¿FLHQWJXLGH,WQHHGV
to more explicitly refer to the different requirements and expectations that are imposed 
upon employers according to their size. The Code should, I believe, deal explicitly with the 
procedures required of small employers. 
The Code also needs to be regularly and frequently updated, and in this regard the 
process and speed with which the Code and its amendments are negotiated at NEDLAC 
needs to be addressed. 
The Code must emphasise the need for a fair procedure, but discourage an overly 
technical approach where failure to comply with a minor requirement on the lengthy 
procedural checklist that many employers have, renders the dismissal procedurally 
unfair. If this were done, it would be a decisive intervention into the labour market, which 
should assist in transforming the overly formalistic and criminal like disciplinary hearing 
proceedings that take place at many employers. 
The overemphasis on technical issues relating to procedural fairness that seems to 
pervade much of the arbitrators’ thinking could also possibly be changed by explaining 
in the Code how compensation awards should be arrived at. Here it may be a good idea 
to make it explicit that compensation for substantive unfairness should be greater than 
compensation for procedural unfairness.
The amendment of the Code should make the labour market more efficient, thereby 
addressing the perception that the labour market is inflexible, especially for small 
employers, without affecting the rights of workers.
%XWVXFKDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQZRXOGQRWEHVXI¿FLHQW ,I WKHSUHVHQWFXOWXUHRIGLVFLSOLQDU\
hearings is to be changed, then substantial education and training of adjudicators, human 
resource personnel and trade unionists will be required. All the social partners need to 
develop and implement a comprehensive plan in this regard. 
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 5. Dismissals for Operational Requirements
When it comes to a retrenchment or a redundancy (i.e. dismissal for operational 
requirements) the employer’s interest is for numerical flexibility i.e. the capacity to 
change the levels of employment cheaply and quickly. The employee’s interest is security 
of employment. How is the balance struck?
It is struck by allowing for dismissals where it is operationally required and by protecting 
the employee from arbitrary loss of employment. In terms of s 188(1) of the LRA, an 
employer may dismiss for operational requirements if there is a fair reason based upon 
that employer’s operational requirements, and after the employer has followed a fair 
procedure. Sections 189 and 189A and the Code of Good Practice on Dismissals based 
on Operational Requirements set out the requirements and procedures that an employer 
should follow. In terms of s 203(3) of the LRA any person interpreting or applying the LRA 
must take into account the relevant Code of Good Practice. If they are adhered to, the 
employer may change its levels of employment and the employee should be protected 
against arbitrary loss of employment.
The decision to dismiss is made by the employer. It evaluates whether or not it has a fair 
reason for the dismissal and whether or not it has followed a fair procedure. The decision 
WRGLVPLVVQHHGQRWEHUDWL¿HGE\WKH0LQLVWHURI/DERXURUVRPHRWKHUH[WHUQDOSDUW\DV
is the case in other countries. 
Moreover, strict adherence to all the requirements of s 189 is not altogether necessary, 
although the failure to adhere to one or more of its provisions may indicate unfairness. 
(Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU (1999) 20 ILJ 89 LAC at  97B-E; Sikhosana & 
others v Sasol Synthetic Fuels (2000) 21 ILJ 649 (LC))
In general, the requirements are that there must be a fair reason based upon the 
employer’s operational requirements, fair and objective selection criteria, disclosure of 
relevant information and meaningful consultation. The consultation, which is conducted 
with a view to reaching consensus, is about the need for the dismissals, alternatives and 
ways to ameliorate the adverse affects of the retrenchments. 
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The legal requirements and procedures are not in and of themselves complex. However, 
the process may become complex when the requirements are applied to a particular 
situation. For example, the employer’s choice of fair and objective selection criteria may 
EHGLI¿FXOWHVSHFLDOO\ LI WKHHPSOR\HUZLVKHV WRPDQLSXODWH WKHPWRVROYHVRPHRI LWV
performance related problems and the employees suspect this hidden agenda.
,W LV LPSRUWDQW WRQRWHWKDW WKHFRVWVDQGGLI¿FXOW\RIUHWUHQFKLQJYDU\VXEVWDQWLDOO\ IURP
case to case. In my experience, where small and medium enterprises retrench one 
employee or a few employees, the retrenchments can be and often are quickly and 
inexpensively done. In my experience, some of these retrenchments take place in less 
than a month, with a few short consultative meetings and exchange of correspondence 
taking place. In other cases, especially larger retrenchments, the process can take much 
longer. This obviously means greater cost, but it is necessary because the parties should 
and must explore alternatives that may save jobs or minimise the adverse effects of those 
dismissals.
There are four problems relating to the law of dismissals for operational requirements. The 
¿UVWLVZKHQLVDPDWWHUSURSHUO\WKHVXEMHFWRIFRQVXOWDWLRQIRURSHUDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWV
and when is it properly a matter for collective bargaining. This is discussed later. The 
second relates to the way in which the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) 
have interpreted the meaning of ‘a fair reason based on an operational requirement’. The 
third relates to the processes envisaged by s 189A. The fourth is the nature and content of 
the Code of Good Practice on Dismissals for Operational Requirements. I shall consider 
the second to fourth problems now. 
5.1 What Constitutes a Fair Reason?
The Labour Court and the LAC have oscillated on this matter (Du Toit, 2005). I do not 
intend to traverse all the nuances and facts of the cases associated with each of the 
approaches, as it is not necessary for the purposes of the point that I wish to make. In 
general, the approaches vary from:
L UHFRJQLVLQJWKHGHVLUHWRLQFUHDVHSUR¿WVDVDOHJLWLPDWHRSHUDWLRQDO
requirement (Hendry v Adcock Ingram (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC); FAWU v 
Simba (Pty) Ltd [1997] 4 BLLR 408 (LC); Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC));
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LL FKHFNLQJWKDWWKHGLVPLVVDOZDVRSHUDWLRQDOO\MXVWL¿DEOHRQ
rational grounds (SACTWU & others v Discreto (A Division of 
Trump & Springbok Holdings) (1998) 10 ILJ 1451 (LAC));
LLL FKHFNLQJWKDWWKHUHLVDFRPPHUFLDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWKHGHFLVLRQWRUHWUHQFK
and whether or not that decision is reasonable and fair to the affected party 
(BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC)); 
(iv) requiring the employer to balance the alternatives such that 
there is only a fair reason to retrench if there is no other rational 
alternative which preserves some or all of the jobs (Enterprise 
Foods (Pty) Ltd v Allen & others (2004) 25 ILJ 1251 (LAC)); to 
(v) only allowing the employer to dismiss employees for operational 
requirements as a measure of last resort (CWIU & others v 
Alograx (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC)).
What is apparent is that the test for substantive fairness has vacillated. The latest LAC 
case of Alograx, which espouses the ‘last resort’ test, probably means that things have 
come full circle i.e. close to the position adopted by the old LAC in the 1993 case of 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ
642 (LAC).  In that case the court held as follows: 
³)DLUQHVVLQWKLVFRQWH[WJRHVIXUWKHUWKDQERQD¿GHVDQGWKHFRPPHUFLDO
MXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWKHGHFLVLRQWRUHWUHQFK,WLVFRQFHUQHG¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVW
with the question whether termination of employment is the only reasonable 
RSWLRQLQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV,WKDVEHFRPHWULWHIRUWKHFRXUWVWRVWDWHWKDW
termination of employment for disciplinary and performance-related reasons 
VKRXOGDOZD\VEHDPHDVXUHRIODVWUHVRUW7KDWLQRXUYLHZDSSOLHVHTXDOO\
WR WHUPLQDWLRQ RI HPSOR\PHQW IRU HFRQRPLF RU RSHUDWLRQDO UHDVRQV´ DW
648D-F)
I predict that this will not necessarily be the end of the debate in the courts. 
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5.2 Section 189A
At the heart of the debate about the correct test for substantive fairness is the willingness 
of the court to second-guess the employer’s business decision that leads to the 
retrenchments. In Discreto (at para 8) Froneman JA stated the following:  
³7KH IXQFWLRQRIDFRXUW LQVFUXWLQL]LQJ WKHFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVV LVQRW WR
VHFRQGJXHVVWKHFRPPHUFLDORUEXVLQHVVHI¿FDF\RIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VXOWLPDWH
GHFLVLRQ DQ LVVXH RQ ZKLFK LW LV JHQHUDOO\ QRW TXDOL¿HG WR SURQRXQFH
upon), but to pass judgment on whether the ultimate decision arrived at 
was genuine and not merely a sham (the kind of issue which courts are 
FDOOHGXSRQWRGRLQGLIIHUHQWVHWWLQJVHYHU\GD\7KHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKH
court adjudges the latter issue is to enquire whether the legal requirements 
for a proper consultation process have been followed and, if so, whether 
the ultimate decision arrived at by the employer is operationally and 
FRPPHUFLDOO\MXVWL¿DEOHRQUDWLRQDOJURXQGVKDYLQJUHJDUGWRZKDWHPHUJHG
IURPWKHFRQVXOWDWLRQSURFHVV,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJ
the rationality of the employer’s ultimate decision on retrenchment, it is not 
the court’s function to decide whether it was the best decision under the 
circumstances, but only whether it was a rational commercial or operational 
decision, properly taking into account what emerged during the consultation 
process.´
However, in Algorax=RQGR-3TXDOL¿HGWKLVDQGDV'X7RLW QRWHV LQKLVDUWLFOH
this decision seemed to herald a more interventionist approach on the part of the court. 
Dealing with the argument that the court normally will not have the business knowledge 
or expertise that the employer as a businessperson may have to deal with the operational 
problems in the business, Zondo JA stated:
³7KLVLVWUXH+RZHYHU LW LVQRWDEVROXWHDQGVKRXOGQRWEHWDNHQWRRIDU
:KHQHLWKHUWKH/DERXU&RXUWRUWKLV&RXUWLVVHL]HGZLWKDGLVSXWHDERXW
the fairness of a dismissal, it has to determine the fairness of the dismissal 
REMHFWLYHO\7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHGLVPLVVDOZDVIDLURUQRWPXVWEH
DQVZHUHGE\ WKHFRXUW7KHFRXUWPXVWQRWGHIHU WR WKHHPSOR\HU IRU WKH
SXUSRVHRIDQVZHULQJWKDWTXHVWLRQ,QRWKHUZRUGVLWFDQQRWVD\WKDWWKH
HPSOR\HUWKLQNVLWIDLUDQGWKHUHIRUHLWLVRUVKRXOGEHIDLU«)XUWKHUPRUH
the court should not hesitate to deal with an issue which requires no special 
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expertise, skills or knowledge that it does not have but simply requires 
FRPPRQVHQVHRUORJLF´
“[Section 189 implies] that the employer has an obligation, if at all possible, 
to avoid dismissals of employees for operational requirements altogether 
RUWRµPLQLPL]HWKHQXPEHURIGLVPLVVDOV¶LISRVVLEOHDQGWRFRQVLGHURWKHU
alternatives of addressing its problems without dismissing the employees 
and to disclose in writing what those alternatives are that it considered and 
WRJLYHUHDVRQVµIRUUHMHFWLQJHDFKRIWKRVHDOWHUQDWLYHV¶,WVHHPVWRPHWKDW
the reason for the lawmaker to require all of these things from the employer 
was to place an obligation on the employer only to resort to dismissing 
HPSOR\HHV IRURSHUDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWVDVDPHDVXUHRI ODVW UHVRUW´ $W
paras 69-70)
It was precisely these issues that were at the heart of the negotiations 
EHWZHHQWKHVRFLDOSDUWQHUVWKDWOHGWRWKHSURPXOJDWLRQRIV$RIWKH/5$
7KHXQLRQVZHUH WKHSULPDU\GULYHUVRI WKLVDPHQGPHQW7KH\SHUFHLYHG
that their members were getting little joy from the courts, which were 
UHOXFWDQWWRLQWHUYHQHDQGVDYHMREVE\GHFODULQJWKHUHWUHQFKPHQWVXQIDLU
7KH\YLHZHGWKHODZDVSUHYHQWLQJWKHPIURPVWULNLQJDERXWUHWUHQFKPHQWV
because retrenchment disputes were disputes that a party had a right to 
UHIHUWRDGMXGLFDWLRQ6HFWLRQFRIWKH/5$SUHYHQWVDVWULNHZKHUH
the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration 
RUWKH/DERXU&RXUW7KH\SHUFHLYHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHFDXJKWEHWZHHQDURFN
and a hard place, unable to get joy from the courts and unable to use power 
WRFRPSHODGLIIHUHQWFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ WRVWHP WKH WLGHRI UHWUHQFKPHQWV
7KH\ WKHUHIRUH GHPDQGHG WKH ULJKW WR VWULNH DERXW UHWUHQFKPHQWV$QG
following the negotiations at the Millennium Labour Council (MLC) and 
1('/$&VHFWLRQ$ZDVERUQ
Section 189A is a compromise. In terms of s 189A(1) it only applies to larger employers 
(i.e. employers employing more than 50 employees) and the number of retrenchments 
in any given 12-month period must be above the prescribed threshold. It prescribes a 
procedure and time framework for negotiations. The time-period cannot be less than 
60 days. Once the employer makes the decision to retrench, the union can challenge 
the procedural fairness of the dismissals or impending dismissals by way of a semi-
urgent application. Furthermore, it can either strike about the substantive fairness of the 
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retrenchments or refer a dispute about the substantive fairness of the retrenchments 
to the Labour Court. If the union refers a dispute about the substantive fairness of the 
retrenchments to the Labour Court, the test for substantive fairness is limited to the test 
set out in the Discreto case. Section 189A(19) of the LRA, which I refer to as the Discreto
test, states the following:
³,QDQ\GLVSXWHUHIHUUHGWRWKH/DERXU&RXUWLQWHUPVRIVHFWLRQELL
WKDW FRQFHUQV WKH GLVPLVVDO RI WKH QXPEHU RI HPSOR\HHV VSHFL¿HG LQ
VXEVHFWLRQ  WKH /DERXU &RXUW PXVW ¿QG WKDW WKH HPSOR\HHV ZDV
dismissed for a fair reason if —
(a) the dismissal was to given effect to a requirement based on the   
  employer’s operational, technological, structural or similar needs;
E WKHGLVPLVVDOZDVRSHUDWLRQDOO\MXVWL¿DEOHRQUDWLRQDOJURXQGVWKHUH
  was proper consideration of alternatives; and selection criteria   
  ZHUHIDLUDQGREMHFWLYH´
There are a number of problems with s 189A, which include the following. In contrast 
to the rest of the LRA, this section is cumbersome and complex, and in my experience 
unionists and employers find it difficult to understand. The LRA limits the test for 
substantive fairness for s 189A retrenchments only. This is in the interest of larger 
employers who engage in larger scale retrenchments. In other words, smaller employers 
may have the ‘last resort’ test applied to their retrenchments. 
In addition, the threshold requirements for the application of s 189A throw up a number 
RIDQRPDOLHVZKLFKDUHGLI¿FXOWWRMXVWLI\UDWLRQDOO\)RUH[DPSOHLIDQHPSOR\HUHPSOR\V
51 employees and 9 of them are retrenched, there is no right to strike and the test for 
adjudicating the substantive fairness of the retrenchments is not limited. However, if two 
months later the employer retrenches one more person, there is a right to strike and the 
test for the substantive fairness of that retrenchment is limited to the Discreto test. If the 
employer employed only 49 employees and 10 of them were retrenched, there would also 
be no right to strike and the test for substantive fairness would not be limited. 
Employer’s interests were met to some extent in s 189A, as it prevented an overly 
interventionist approach by the courts, which is something employers fear, especially 
given the lengthy delays in adjudicating disputes at the Labour Court. 
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I believe that s 189A has pointed us in the direction of the answer. The resolution to 
the problem is grounded in the distinction between interest and rights disputes. The 
operational decision that gives rise to retrenchments is an interest matter. The parties 
should be able to negotiate and resort to a power play over the operational decision that 
gives rise to the retrenchments. This means that workers should be entitled to strike about 
the operational decision that gives rise to the retrenchments. For example, they should be 
DEOHWRVWULNHLQVXSSRUWRIWKHGHPDQGWKDWWKHHPSOR\HUVDYHMREVDQGWDNHOHVVSUR¿WV
that the employer not implement outsourcing, etc. Employers would have recourse to a 
lock-out or could act unilaterally. On the other hand, disputes about the fairness of the 
retrenchments themselves are rights disputes, which should be adjudicated by the courts. 
At the same time, we have to recognise that a power play is not always possible or 
appropriate in many circumstances. A strike is often of little effect or value where the 
majority of employees are to be dismissed. Moreover, employees not only have a 
constitutional right to fair labour practices, but in terms of s 34 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”) they also the right to 
have “any right that can be resolved by application of the law decided in a fair public 
KHDULQJ«”. Therefore, there must be choice about resolving the matter through collective 
bargaining or adjudication. 
7KHWUDGHRIIZKLFK LVSUHVHQWO\UHÀHFWHG LQV$ LV WKDW LIZRUNHUVGRQRWH[HUFLVH
their right to strike over the operational decision that gives rise to the dismissals and 
refer a rights dispute to the Labour Court, then a non-interventionist approach akin to the 
Discreto test is appropriate. In other words, workers obtain the right to strike about the 
operational decision, but if they exercise their right to adjudicate the substantive fairness 
of the retrenchments, the test is limited to the Discreto test. 
This should apply to all businesses. A non-interventionist approach to the adjudication of 
the substantive fairness of a retrenchment would be in the interests of smaller employers 
as well. Workers at smaller employers should also have the right to strike about the 
operational decision that gives rise to the retrenchments. Furthermore, if it applied to all 
businesses, the problems arising from the anomalies relating to the thresholds would be 
resolved.
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5.3 The Code of Good Practice 
The problem with the Code on Dismissals for Operational Requirements is that it says 
nothing more than what is stated in s 189. It is of little assistance to employers and trade 
unionists involved in retrenchment consultations. It is certainly of little assistance to the 
small employer who contemplates retrenching one or two employees. 
A revised Code is called for that sets out more clearly what is required of an employer 
who contemplates retrenching. I also suggest that it includes a section dedicated to the 
small employer (as well as employers of domestic workers) that sets out a simple and 
abbreviated process for small employers and their employees. 
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 6. Probation and Newly Hired Employees
This is indeed a troublesome issue. The history of the issue is as follows. Probation was 
originally not referred to in the new LRA, including the Code relating to dismissals for 
misconduct or incapacity. In 2000 the government proposed amendments to the LRA, 
amongst which there were two proposals. 
The first was that an employee was fairly dismissed within her first six months of 
employment due to incompatibility or poor performance if the employer followed a fair 
procedure. In other words, the dismissal need not have been substantively fair. The 
proposal also limited procedural fairness to giving the employee an opportunity to make 
her representations. 
The second was an amendment to the Code on dismissal for misconduct and incapacity. 
7KHDPHQGPHQWSURYLGHGIRUDSHULRGRISUREDWLRQDQGVSHFL¿HGDPRQJVWRWKHUWKLQJV
that if an employee was dismissed during her probationary period, then the reasons for 
dismissal may be less compelling than would be the case for dismissals effected after the 
successful completion of the probationary period. 
7KHWUDGHXQLRQPRYHPHQWH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQDERXW WKHSURSRVDOHVSHFLDOO\ WKH¿UVW
one. The compromise was to adopt the second proposal, but to include guidelines for 
employers with regard to the kind of procedures that should be followed in the case of 
poor performance. As Cheadle points out, the Code omitted to deal with incompatibility. 
The first proposal was rather bizarre because it obliterated the employee’s right to 
substantive fairness, but kept in tact her right to procedural fairness. The employer was 
required to go through the procedural motions only; it did not have to have a substantively 
fair reason for terminating the contract. Perhaps if the proposal had been the other way 
round – obliging the employer to have a substantively fair reason for the dismissal, albeit 
on a lesser scale than an ordinary dismissal after the six month period, but not requiring 
the employer to follow a fair procedure – the proposal might have been more palatable 
and another trade off might have been possible. Giving up the right to a fair procedure is 
not too problematic when the employee still has the right to refer a dispute to arbitration 
i.e. the employee will be afforded her right to be heard at the CCMA, bargaining council or 
Labour Court. In any event, a prudent employer would grant a hearing in order to check 
that it does have a substantively fair reason for the dismissal.
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In the negotiations that led to the 2002 amendments, the trade unions’ primary concern 
that employers may use probation unfairly by continually extending the probationary 
period was resolved by listing probation as one of the residual unfair labour practices. It 
was also introduced to deal with their other fear, which was that employers might impose 
a probationary period that was excessively long and disproportionate to the nature of the 
job. As far as I know very few disputes relating to probation as a basis for an unfair labour 
practice have been declared. 
The issue of probation and newly hired employees has been raised again. The argument 
DSSHDUVWREHWKDW WKHGLI¿FXOWLHVRIGLVPLVVLQJHPSOR\HHVDUHDEDUULHU WRHPSOR\PHQW
EHFDXVHLI LWZHUHHDVLHUWR¿UHPRUHHPSOR\HHVZRXOGEHKLUHG7KHPRWLYDWLRQIRUWKH
proposal is apparently job creation. Of course, there is leap of faith in this argument: if 
HPSOR\HUVFRXOG¿UHPRUHHDVLO\ZRXOGPRUHSHUVRQVEHKLUHGRUZRXOG WKHUH MXVWEH
DJUHDWHU WXUQRYHURIVWDII"7KHDUJXPHQWDOVRSUHVXSSRVHVWKDW LW LVGLI¿FXOW WR¿UH IRU
incompatibility or poor performance, which I take issue with. Perhaps this matter would 
not cause such concern if managers were better trained in how to deal with these matters. 
0RUHRYHUZRUNHUVZKRGHVSHUDWHO\ IHDU WKHXQHPSOR\PHQWTXHXHZLWKDOO LWVKRUUL¿F
UDPL¿FDWLRQVZLOOZLWKRXWGRXEWVHH WKHSURSRVDODVDPHUHDWWHPSW WRGLPLQLVK WKHLU
rights and make them more vulnerable. If a proposal of this nature is to be implemented, 
it will have to be carefully motivated to deal with their legitimate fears and it will have to 
WKHDUWLFXODWHGPRUHVFLHQWL¿FDOO\ WKDQ LWKDVEHHQWRGDWH0RVW LPSRUWDQWO\DSURSRVDO
of this nature would also have to pass the constitutional test for a limitation of the right to 
IDLUODERXUSUDFWLFHVZKLFKPD\EHGLI¿FXOW7KHJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGKDYHWRFRQYLQFHWKH
Constitutional Court, amongst other things, that in terms of s 36(1)(e) of the Constitution 
there was not a less restrictive means of achieving their purpose . 
Cheadle’s proposal that the period of service should include all previous service with 
the employer prevents employers from trying to escape the application of labour laws 
by terminating just before the expiry of the six-month period and then re-employing. 
+RZHYHU LWGRHVQRWSUHYHQWWKHSRVVLELOLW\ WKDWDQHPSOR\HUPD\¿UHEHIRUHWKHHQGRI
the six-month period and then re-hire another new employee, which is possible for non-
skilled jobs. In addition, an employer may be discouraged from employing a person that it 
has employed for six months before as opposed to a new employee. The reason for this 
is that with the latter, the employer is able to escape its normal obligations with regard to 
dismissal. I suspect that these will be some of the concerns of workers.
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At the same time, we have to recognise that there is a trend internationally to remove 
some or all of the protections from dismissal in respect of newly hired employees. (As far 
DV,NQRZWKDWFKDPSLRQRIVRFLDOGHPRFUDF\0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¿UVW LQWURGXFHGLW  ,I
such a provision were introduced, then relaxations with regard to newly hired employees 
should include appropriate regulations that discourage the kinds of problems referred to 
above, adequately protect newly hired employees from discrimination, victimisation and at 
least guarantee some degree of substantive fairness (for example, the dismissal must at 
OHDVWEHMXVWL¿DEOHRQUDWLRQDOJURXQGV
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 7. Recruitment and Hiring
I align myself with Cheadle’s comments about selection decisions, save for my comments 
about promotions. 
In particular, I think that it is necessary that the remedy of requiring an employer to hire an 
HPSOR\HHYLFWLPLVHGIRUKHUWUDGHXQLRQDI¿OLDWLRQDQGDFWLYLWLHVVKRXOGEHDYDLODEOH
 8. Unfair Labour Practices
7KHUHVLGXDOXQIDLUODERXUSUDFWLFHLVQRZGH¿QHGLQVRIWKH/5$&KHDGOHSURSRVHV
that the unfair labour practice be scrapped and that those aspects that are necessary 
to retain, such as the regulation of unfair suspension (and presumably occupational 
detriments in contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act No. 26 o 2000), be kept in 
another form. He also states that in relation to small business they should be scrapped, 
as they are incidents associated with larger employers. 
Before dealing with the content of Cheadle’s proposals I wish to make a few preliminary 
points.
I wonder to what extent the residual unfair labour practices, as presently contained in 
the LRA, are a major cause for rigidity in the labour market. The reason for this is that, 
according to Benjamin and Gruen (2005), unfair labour practice referrals only constitute 7 
per cent of all the disputes at the CCMA.
I suspect that many employees, particularly middle and upper level employees, will be 
anxious about giving up their right to process disputes relating to the residual unfair 
labour practices. They will fear that they may be left without a remedy where they have a 
legitimate grievance. I, however, suspect that for the wily amongst the trade unionists, the 
issue will inevitably be what employees, who give up their right to process unfair labour 
practices, will get in return?
I believe that as many residual unfair labour practices involve disputes about individual 
employees, it may still be necessary to regulate the exercise of employer power in 
certain circumstances. I, therefore, do not think that it is always suitable and correct to 
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leave the regulation of certain labour practices to collective bargaining. The question 
is, which labour practices should be regulated in a statute and which ones should be 
left to the parties to regulate through collective agreement. Of course, when we answer 
this question we have to bear in mind that if there is no collective agreement, then the 
employer may act unilaterally, provided it does not materially change terms and conditions 
of employment. It is the very possibility that there may not be an agreement about the 
regulation of a labour practice that may require, from a policy point of view, a statute to 
regulate the fairness of the employer’s conduct. 
If a labour practice is to be regulated, then in the interests of legal certainty, I think it is a 
JRRGLGHDIRUWKHODZWREHVSHFL¿FDQGQRWEURDG,QRWKHUZRUGVLWZRXOGEHPRUHXVHIXO
to spell out what is outlawed or what an employer may or may not do when it comes to 
suspension, for example, than to simply say that the employer may not conduct itself 
unfairly with regard to the suspension of an employee. With the former the employer 
knows exactly what it may or may not do. The law regulating that labour practice could be 
articulated in a provision dedicated to the relevant topic, such as suspension, and it could 
be explained in a Code of Practice. 
Bearing those general comments in mind, I consider some of the residual unfair labour 
practices and the question of transfer. 
8.1 Promotion 
Promotion disputes are more common in large institutions and the public service, in 
particular the education sector, parastatals, etc. Promotion disputes do not usually involve 
blue-collar workers. When it comes to small employers I suspect that promotion disputes 
are few and far between.
Appointments are generally not regulated. There are two exceptions. Firstly, for the 
purposes of unfair discrimination, an applicant for appointment is considered an employee. 
6HFRQGO\HPSOR\HUVZKRVHWXUQRYHULVDERYHWKHSUHVFULEHGPLQLPDVSHFL¿HGLQWHUPVRI
WKH(PSOR\PHQW(TXLW\$FW1RRI(($DUHREOLJHGWRDGRSWDI¿UPDWLYHDFWLRQ
plans that may affect appointments. There is no further need to regulate appointments in a 
statute, except perhaps in the public sector; however, the question is whether promotions, 
as a species of appointment, should be regulated in any further way. 
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&KHDGOHPDNHVWKUHHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV7KH¿UVW LV WKDW WKHUHIHUHQFHWRSURPRWLRQ LQ
WKHGH¿QLWLRQRI WKHXQIDLU ODERXUSUDFWLFHEHGHOHWHG7KHVHFRQGLV WKDW WKH3URPRWLRQ
of Administrative Justice Act No 3 of 2000 (PAJA) be amended to exclude the State’s 
employment decisions from judicial review under that Act. The second is that the 
Public Service Act (Proclamation 103 of 1994) be amended to provide for a judicial or 
administrative remedy for corrupt or inept appointments.
Let me begin with the last two suggestions. I think it is a good idea to exclude the State’s 
employment decisions from judicial review under PAJA. One remedy should be provided 
for all employees and there is no need for overlapping jurisdiction between the LRA and 
PAJA when it comes to public service employees. 
In the context of our increasing concern for corruption and service delivery, it is a good 
idea that the Public Service Act be amended to provide for a judicial or administrative 
remedy for corrupt or inept appointments. But why should it be limited to the public 
service?  Why should it not apply to parastatals or private institutions that perform public 
functions and services such as banks?
,WLVDOLWWOHPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRUHDGLO\DJUHHWR&KHDGOH¶V¿UVWSURSRVDODERXWWKHGHOHWLRQLQ
the LRA of the unfair labour practice relating to promotions. The reasons for this are set 
out below. 
Promotions usually involve questions relating to an employee’s career path in an 
organisation, which is an emotive issue for many employees, particularly for middle and 
upper level employees. This is why employees want to ensure that the procedure and 
criteria for choosing the appropriate candidate are fair and rational. 
In some sectors such as public education, promotions are regulated by collective 
agreements. Insofar as there is a collective agreement, the employee has a remedy to 
process a promotion dispute because the dispute will always be about the interpretation 
or application of the agreement. 
But what if there is no agreement and no residual unfair labour practice relating to 
promotions?  What if the employer only has a policy on promotions, but it does not 
constitute an agreement? How does the employee process her grievance about a 
SURPRWLRQGLVSXWH LI WKHUH LVQRVSHFL¿FVWDWXWRU\SURYLVLRQGHDOLQJZLWKWKLVPDWWHU" ,Q
such a case the employee is without a remedy unless she can show unfair discrimination 
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RUYLFWLPLVDWLRQ ,W LVXVXDOO\YHU\GLI¿FXOW WR UHVROYH LQGLYLGXDOGLVSXWHVRI WKLVQDWXUH
through negotiations and collective bargaining. 
,QDGGLWLRQZLOO LWQRWEHPRUHGLI¿FXOW IRU WUDGHXQLRQVWRVHFXUHFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWV
regulating promotions, if the employer is not obliged statutorily to act fairly in relation to 
promotions?  The possibility of different and varying awards if each promotion dispute 
ZHUHLQGHSHQGHQWO\DGMXGLFDWHGLQWHUPVRIWKHXQIDLU ODERXUSUDFWLFHGH¿QLWLRQ LVVXUHO\
part of the reason why an employer agrees to or prescribes a promotions policy and 
procedure.
3URPRWLRQ LVVXHVDUHHPRWLRQDODQGGLI¿FXOW LVVXHV LQPDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\
those with large bureaucracies, because they affect an employee’s career advancement. 
I agree that employers and trade unions should be encouraged to agree upon their own 
promotion policies and procedures. However, this does not mean that employees should 
be left without a remedy for unfair conduct on the part of the employer, where there is no 
agreed policy and procedure. 
8.2 Demotion 
As Cheadle correctly points out a demotion occurs in three contexts: firstly, as 
a disciplinary measure; secondly, as an alternative to a dismissal for incapacity; and 
thirdly, as an alternative to retrenchment. In each case the employee must consent to 
the demotion. If the employee does not consent, then at common law the demotion is 
a repudiation of a contract, allowing an employee to sue for breach of contract or unfair 
dismissal.
Cheadle argues that the courts and the CCMA have held that demotion must be preceded 
by consultation and counselling, which is something less than consent and is incorrect. 
For him this illustrates the dangers of providing remedies when there are sufficient 
remedies to secure the protection from the unfair exercise of employer power. 
I agree with Cheadle, yet I have two concerns. The unfair labour practice with regard to 
GHPRWLRQVKRXOGUHÀHFWWKHFRPPRQODZSRVLWLRQDUWLFXODWHGDERYH%XWZKHQDQRUGLQDU\
employee is demoted she does not immediately perceive it as a dismissal. She merely 
wants to process her grievance to the relevant body such as the CCMA as a demotion 
dispute. She should be able to do this without having to consult a lawyer to obtain a legal 
analysis of the real nature of demotion. Therefore, if demotion is to be deleted, then in 
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some way the statute or Code must direct the employee who wants to challenge the 
demotion. It must also explain its true legal nature and guide commissioners with regard 
to the legal options for relief where there is an unfair demotion. 
Secondly, many disciplinary codes provide for demotion as a possible disciplinary 
sanction. The fact that an employee or her trade union has agreed to the Code should 
QRWFRQVWLWXWHWKHQHFHVVDU\FRQVHQWIRUDGHPRWLRQDIWHUDGLVFLSOLQDU\HQTXLU\¿QGVDQ
employee guilty of misconduct. If it were, then the demotion might not be considered a 
dismissal (because there was consent), but a disciplinary measure short of dismissal, and 
if that unfair labour practice were deleted, the employee would not be able to challenge 
WKH IDLUQHVVRI WKH¿QGLQJDQG WKHGHPRWLRQ7KDWZRXOGEHXQWHQDEOH7KLVFRXOGEH
cured with a suitable explanation to this effect in the Code. 
 %HQH¿WV
:KHQLWFRPHVWRWKHXQIDLU ODERXUSUDFWLFHZLWKUHJDUGWREHQH¿WV LW LVHYLGHQWWKDWWKLV
SURYLVLRQKDVFUHDWHGVXEVWDQWLDOGLI¿FXOW\IRUWKHFRXUWV2 It is now evident that a dispute 
FRQFHUQLQJDQXQIDLU ODERXUSUDFWLFHUHODWLQJ WREHQH¿WVFDQQRWEHGHFODUHG LQRUGHU WR
FUHDWHDULJKW WRDEHQH¿W6HH LQ WKLV UHJDUGHOSPERSA & another v Northern Cape 
Provincial Administration (2002) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC) and Protekon (Pty) Ltd v Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration and others (2005) 26 ILJ 1105 (LC). This is 
something that should be left to collective bargaining. 
Cheadle argues that the unfair labour practice with regard to benefits should be 
disregarded for two reasons: The first is that if benefits are granted in terms of an 
agreement, the employee has a legal remedy relating to the breach of that agreement. 
This is valid.
,I WKHUHZDVQRXQIDLU ODERXUSUDFWLFHZLWK UHJDUG WR WKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVDQG WKH
employer has a discretion to grant the benefit in terms of an agreement, then the 
employee may not be able to challenge the fairness of the employer’s exercise of 
that discretion. The exception is if the employee could show that there is an explicit, 
implied or tactic term of the agreement that the power to exercise the discretion must be 
2 A useful article on the subject entitled “What is an employment ‘benefit’?” by PAK Le Roux appears in Contemporary   
Labour Law Vol 15 No 1 August 2005
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conducted fairly. All of this is correct because the agreement must have been a product of 
negotiations or collective bargaining. 
Cheadle’s second reason is that where the unfair labour practice remedy constitutes 
a mere ‘judicial review’ of the employer’s exercise of power, then the mechanism for 
ensuring fairness should rather be collective bargaining and structured worker 
participation. Cheadle further motivates this by arguing that there is no reason why the 
HPSOR\HU¶VH[HUFLVHRISRZHUZLWKUHJDUGWREHQH¿WVVKRXOGEHUHJXODWHGZKHQLWVSRZHUV
to hire, transfer and to direct how and when work is done, are not subject to regulation. 
I agree with this in general, save for the following. Firstly, I am not sure what ‘structured 
worker participation’ means in this context. Secondly, while I agree that collective 
EDUJDLQLQJVKRXOGEH WKHUHPHG\IRUFUHDWLQJDULJKW WRDEHQH¿WFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ
PD\QRWDOZD\VEHDVXI¿FLHQWRUVDWLVIDFWRU\UHPHG\IRUUHVROYLQJJULHYDQFHVDERXWD
GLVSXWHUHODWLQJWRWKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WV
Take this scenario relating to the unfair or inconsistent provision of benefits: Two 
HPSOR\HHVDUHQRWJUDQWHGDEHQH¿WZKHUH WKHLUFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQWSURYLGH WKDW
the employer has a discretion to grant it. The contract does not include an explicit, implied 
or tacit term to the effect that the discretion must be exercised reasonably or fairly. All 
RWKHUHPSOR\HHVDUHJUDQWHGWKHEHQH¿W7KHUHLVQRGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQ
one of the listed (e.g. race, gender, etc) or analogous grounds; however, the employer’s 
approach vis-à-vis the two employees is inconsistent, irrational and therefore unfair. 
Should the two employees’ only remedy be to bargain, and failing negotiations, to go out 
on strike?
In many situations like this, employees would not have the capacity to organise and 
mobilise a strike about such a matter and they would be effectively without a remedy. 
Moreover, I think that as a matter of policy, we should limit strikes about this kind of 
LUUDWLRQDOEHKDYLRXU,EHOLHYHWKDWLUUDWLRQDOFRQGXFWDERXWWKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVZKHUH
HPSOR\HHVDOUHDG\KDYHDULJKWWRWKHEHQH¿WRUWKHHPSOR\HUKDVDGLVFUHWLRQWRSURYLGH
WKHEHQH¿WVKRXOGEHUHJXODWHGLQWKHODZ6HHWKHGLVFXVVLRQXQGHUVHFWLRQDERXWWKH
need for a doctrine relating to equal pay for equivalent work, which is similar.)
Furthermore, the case of Protekon indicates that the employer’s exercise of a discretion to 
JUDQWRUUHIXVHDEHQH¿WLQWHUPVRIDVFKHPHFRQIHUULQJWKHEHQH¿WLHZKHUHWKHUHLVQR
contractual right to be enforced), may be subjected to the CCMA’s scrutiny in terms of the 
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unfair labour practice jurisdiction. It does not seem appropriate to require the resolution of 
this kind of dispute through collective bargaining. 
,WKHUHIRUHVXJJHVWWKDWLWPD\EHXVHIXOWRUHJXODWHWKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVLQDVSHFL¿F
section of a statute such as the BCEA. It may be necessary to prescribe in the statute or 
&RGHRI3UDFWLFHWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIXQIDLUFRQGXFWUHODWLQJWRWKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WV
8.4 Discipline Short of Dismissal
Cheadle argues that there is no good reason to regulate the employer’s power to 
discipline, once the power to dismiss as a disciplinary measure is regulated. He argues 
that if an employer relies on an earlier warning to justify a dismissal, the fairness of the 
previous warning can be raised at the dismissal hearing. It seems unnecessary to clog 
up the dispute resolution institutions with disputes of this nature, which are potentially 
numerous.
The deletion of this unfair labour practice is clearly in the interests of employers. I believe 
that its deletion may also be advantageous to employees because of the following. Many 
employees do not challenge warnings issued against them by referring unfair labour 
practice disputes to the CCMA or the relevant bargaining council. It is frequently argued 
at their dismissal dispute that they acquiesced to the warning because they did not refer 
such a dispute. This proposal would cure this problem. 
+RZHYHU , IRUHVHH WKUHHSUREOHPV7KH¿UVW LV WKDWZLWKRXW WKLVSURYLVLRQ WKHUH LVQR
statutory obligation on employers to accord employees a fair procedure (i.e. the right to be 
heard) before imposing a disciplinary sanction short of dismissal. It might be argued that 
this should be left up to collective bargaining, but I think that would not be appropriate in 
all circumstances. If there was no collective agreement regarding disciplinary procedures 
at an employer, then the employer could impose disciplinary sanctions short of dismissal 
without according employees the right to be heard. This might not be a major problem if 
WKHVDQFWLRQZHUHRQO\DZDUQLQJZKLFKZRXOGQRWDIIHFWWKHHPSOR\HH¿QDQFLDOO\EXWLILW
involved a suspension without pay it might be a completely different story.
The second problem relates to the situation where the employee has the possibility of 
being promoted, but will potentially not get the promotion because of her disciplinary 
record. If the employee cannot review the warning and she cannot challenge the failure to 
DPRU Working Paper 07/116
               32
promote, she may be left in a rather invidious position. 
The third problem is that disciplinary warnings often mean that an employee does not 
get a bonus or a notch increase. How would an employee challenge this, if this unfair 
labour practice were deleted and there was no agreement regulating the fairness of the 
employer’s exercise of its discretion not to award a bonus or notch increase?
8.5 Suspension
I agree with Cheadle’s analysis and recommendations relating to this unfair labour 
practice. It is necessary to highlight that in my experience the employer’s abuse of the 
power to suspend employees pending a disciplinary hearing, particularly in the public 
service, is widespread. The abuse is twofold: suspensions are arbitrarily made and are 
OHQJWK\,W LVQRWUDUHWR¿QGVXVSHQVLRQVWKDWHQGXUHIRUWZR\HDUV7KHSUHVHQWUHPHG\
of referring a dispute to the CCMA or relevant bargaining council seems to be inadequate 
and proper regulation of this labour practice is necessary. 
8.6 Transfers
I think that the employer’s powers with regard to transfers should be subject to some kind 
of ‘judicial review’. The employer should be obliged to act fairly where transfers are not 
regulated by collective agreement or another statute.
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 9. Equal Pay for Equivalent Work
Many employees raise the grievance of unequal pay for equivalent work. How should a 
dispute about such a matter be resolved?  There are a number of options. The dispute 
can be resolved through collective bargaining. I deal with whether this should be the only 
appropriate remedy below. If the employee wishes to refer a rights dispute, she has two 
possible options. If the matter involves a promotion, the employee may refer an unfair 
labour practice dispute relating to promotion. If the matter involves unfair discrimination, 
she may refer a dispute in terms of the EEA. I think it was initially thought that disputes 
about equal pay for equivalent work would involve some aspect of discrimination and that 
employees, therefore, had an adequate remedy. But in the light of the provisions of the 
EEA this is not always the case. 
Section 6 of the EEA prohibits discrimination only on the following terms: 
“No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against any 
employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV 
VWDWXVFRQVFLHQFHEHOLHISROLWLFDORSLQLRQFXOWXUHODQJXDJHDQGELUWK´
The list of discriminatory grounds in s 6 is not a closed list, and other grounds that are 
analogous may be relied on. In order to succeed under s 6, a ground – either a listed 
ground or an analogous, unlisted ground – must be established. 
The anti-discrimination provision that was contained in item 2(1)(a) of schedule 7 of 
the LRA prior to the coming into effect of the EEA made reference to discrimination on 
³DQ\DUELWUDU\JURXQG´. There was a suggestion in the jurisprudence at the time that 
the reference to ³DQ\DUELWUDU\JURXQG´ meant that “mere” arbitrary treatment would be 
VXI¿FLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKDGLVFULPLQDWLRQFODLP6HHLQWKLVUHJDUGKadiaka v ABI (1999) 20 
ILJ 373. 
However, this item was repealed by the EEA and s 6 of the EEA no longer contains any 
reference to a mere “arbitrary ground” of discrimination. The Labour Court has held in 
both NUMSA and others v Gabriels [2002] (12) BLLR 1210 at para 19 and Ntai and others 
v SA Breweries [2001] (2) BLLR 186 para 17 that in order to establish a discrimination 
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FODLPEDVHGRQWKLVVHFWLRQLWLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWWRDOOHJHWKDWWKHHPSOR\HUDFWHGDUELWUDULO\
,QVWHDGDQDOOHJHGJURXQG IRUGLVFULPLQDWLRQPXVWEHVSHFL¿HGDQG WKHUHPXVWEHD
causal link between the ground and the discriminatory conduct.
In many instances there is no coherent listed ground of discrimination and all that can be 
said is that the remuneration of employees is determined irrationally and arbitrarily.
It may be possible to raise qualification and expertise as analogous grounds of 
discrimination, but it is probable that these grounds may not be found to be analogous 
because an analogous ground must be one that relates to a claimant’s personality and 
identity that is intrinsic to, and has the potential to impair, human dignity (Harksen v Lane
[1997] (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at para 50. An example of a ground of discrimination that 
has been recognised by our courts is citizenship. See in this regard Larbi-Odam v MEC 
for Education (North-West Province) [1997] (12) BCLR 1655 (CC) at para 19.
Therefore, on the basis of the language of s 6 and the jurisprudence of the Labour Court 
arising out of this section, a claim for equal pay for equivalent work is often not possible. 
This means that if the dispute does not involve a promotion issue or the employee cannot 
establish a listed or analogous ground of discrimination, the employees must live with 
the irrational and arbitrary disparities in pay for equivalent work. The employee’s only 
option then is to refer an interest dispute and hope that through the process of collective 
bargaining the matter can be resolved. Is this satisfactory?  I do not think so because in 
many instances it is not possible or appropriate for employees to exercise power in such 
matters. It seems to me that that statutory expression should be given to the constitutional 
rights to equality and fair labour practices where the differentiation in remuneration or 
EHQH¿WVLVLQFRQVLVWHQWDQGXQIDLUEXWGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\LQYROYHDOLVWHGRUDQDORJRXV
ground of discrimination. 
In my experience disputes of this nature are common amongst blue-collar workers, and 
hence by providing for a legal remedy, strikes about such matters could be avoided. 
Therefore, a doctrine of equal pay for equivalent work should be included in the EEA and 
its content developed in a Code of Good Practice. Naturally the doctrine and the potential 
sanctions that can be imposed upon an employer that has transgressed the doctrine 
would have to be carefully crafted. 
An Exploratory Look into Labour Market Regulation               Anton Roskam
              35
 10. Challenges Facing Dispute Resolution Institutions
A debate about labour market regulation cannot be limited to what the regulations say. 
Part of the problem is the way in which those regulations are implemented. That raises 
the issue about the manner in which our dispute resolution institutions function. If they are 
QRWIXQFWLRQLQJHI¿FLHQWO\WKHQLWPD\QRWKHOSWRFKDQJHWKHUHJXODWLRQV5DWKHUDWWHQWLRQ
should be given to those institutions. This is, I believe, a large part of the problem. 
I do not have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of dispute resolution at the 
bargaining councils, but my impression is that it varies from council to council. This is 
an area that needs attention because many disputes are not handled by the CCMA. 
For instance, the public service bargaining councils deal with the public service, which 
employs about 15per cent of all formal workers.
10.1 The Labour Court
One of the key developments of the new LRA was the establishment of a specialist labour 
court dealing with important and complex labour matters. There are numerous problems 
with this court. In my experience some of the problems are the following:
L 7KHFRXUW¿QGVLWGLI¿FXOWWRDWWUDFWVXI¿FLHQWSHUPDQHQWMXGJHVRIFDOLEUH
LQWKH¿HOGRIODERXUODZ)RUMXGJHVWKH/DERXU&RXUWKDV³FRPHWREH
viewed as a career dead-end, particularly as appointments to the court 
DUHIRUD¿[HGWHUP´%HQMDPLQ-XGJHVRIWKH/DERXU&RXUW
UHFHLYHLQIHULRUEHQH¿WVDVFRPSDUHGZLWK+LJK&RXUWMXGJHVDQGWKH\
are seen as having a diminished status. Besides this, a competent lawyer 
who decides to go to the bench probably does not want to be “stuck” in 
the Labour Court dealing with retrenchment cases, reviews and strike 
interdicts. A permanent judge of the Labour Court has little ability to circulate 
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to the High Court and have exposure to other kinds of cases and law.3
(ii) There has been an over-reliance on acting judges, some 
of whom have very little experience in labour law. This has 
undermined the specialist nature of the Labour Court.
(iii) The judges on the LAC change frequently so that important precedent setting 
FDVHVDUHRIWHQRYHUWXUQHGPDNLQJLWGLI¿FXOWWRNQRZZLWKFHUWDLQW\ZKDWWKHODZ
LV6RPHRIWKHMXGJHVRIWKH/$&KDYHLQVXI¿FLHQWH[SHULHQFHLQODERXUPDWWHUV
(iv) The administration of the court is problematic – there is often over-
intervention in the processing of cases, instead of leaving it up to the parties 
to determine through the application of rules, as is the case in the High 
&RXUW)RULQVWDQFHUHTXLUHPHQWVDUHPDGHWKDWWKHSDUWLHVPXVW¿OHWKHLU
heads of argument before they may set their application down. It is also 
common for the court to require heads of argument in simple unopposed 
matters, which increases legal costs unnecessarily. Such requirements do 
QRW¿QGH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHFRXUW¶VUXOHV,QIDFWWKHSURFHGXUDOSUDFWLFHV
RIWKHFRXUWRIWHQGLYHUJHVLJQL¿FDQWO\IURPWKHUXOHVRIWKHFRXUW
(v) The Court’s Rules Board has not met for many years to evaluate and update 
its rules in accordance with best practice. Some of the rules need urgent 
attention. This would include the rules regulating reviews of arbitration awards.
 (vi)There are serious delays in the setting down of matters. It is common, 
for example, for a simple review application to take up to two years. 
3 As Benjamin points out in the article quoted above, a proposal to allow Labour Court judges to move to the High   
 Court on completion of their term of office, was contained in the draft Labour Relations Bill published    
 for comment in July 2000. This proposal would have enhanced the attractiveness of the Labour Court as   
 an entry point into life on the bench. However, it was withdrawn from subsequent versions of the bill, at the   
 request of the Ministry of Justice.
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(vii) Judgments are often delayed. For example, the LAC judgment in the matter of 
NEHAWU and others v University of Pretoria [2006] 5 BLLR 437 (LAC), which 
involved the retrenchment of over 600 workers, took about 18 months to produce. 
The effect of a delay is more frequently to the detriment of the applicants, who 
are mostly workers. It is easier for the judge to excuse the delay if the applicant 
is unsuccessful because then she can argue that the applicant is in no worse a 
position than if the order had been given within a reasonable period of time. 
Because of the problems referred to above, there has been a growing and powerful lobby 
for the integration of the Labour Court into the High Court. The Superior Court’s Bill is now 
before Parliament. Will this resolve all the problems?  I doubt it. 
It may address some of the structural problems relating to the appointment of permanent 
judges. But it will not necessarily address the administrative problems that cause serious 
delays in the resolution of cases. This must be addressed comprehensively by ensuring 
WKH5HJLVWUDU¶VRI¿FHLVUXQHI¿FLHQWO\DQGE\UHGUDIWLQJDQGUHJXODUO\XSGDWLQJWKHUXOHV
of court. 
The Superior Court’s Bill also has a number of problems. First of all it does not establish 
a specialist court for labour, which I believe is a serious blunder. Does this mean that 
the reasons that were advanced for a specialist court in 1995 no longer exist?  There 
is an argument that to a much greater extent labour law has become a question of the 
application of statutory rules and that it is no longer the ‘cutting edge’ discipline that broke 
new ground during the 1980s and 1990s (Benjamin, 2003). I question this. Moreover, 
when it comes to dismissals, an adjudicator in a labour matter must still evaluate fairness, 
take into account human relations and understand and cherish the function and purpose 
of collective bargaining and the right to strike. This requires specialist expertise and 
experience.
Allied to this is the notion that judges can attend a short course in labour law at their 
WUDLQLQJFROOHJHDQGWKHQEHTXDOL¿HGWRDGMXGLFDWHDODERXUGLVSXWH%HDULQJLQPLQGWKDW
it is generally only the more complex disputes that will proceed to the High Court, this is a 
somewhat alarming provision. What a labour law judge needs is experience in labour law, 
not simply an academic understanding of the provisions of the labour statutes. 
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The other problem is that the High Court does not have national jurisdiction. This means 
that if there is a national strike or lock-out or a retrenchment of employees from a single 
employer in different jurisdictions of the country, the applicant will have to bring separate 
applications in the respective High Courts having jurisdiction. This is not only a waste of 
time, but will unnecessarily increase legal costs. 
The last issue relates to the capacity of officials of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to represent their members in the High Court. It does not seem that a 
VSHFL¿FSURYLVLRQKDVEHHQPDGHIRUWKLV
10.2 The CCMA
It is difficult to assess the CCMA. The statistics contained in the paper by Benjamin 
and Gruen (2005) do not seem to reveal the entire picture. I am also mindful that my 
experience of the CCMA is limited to Gauteng and is usually in respect of reviews, where I 
frequently see the ‘worst’ of the CCMA arbitrations. Speak to any practicing labour lawyer 
and they will often regale you with horror stories about the CCMA, many of its arbitration 
awards and of frequent delays, postponements and the like. But does this tell the entire 
picture or are lawyers just exposed to the bad cases, which are by virtue of the number of 
GLVSXWHVUHODWLYHO\IHZ,DPDOVRWROGWKDWWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFDSDFLW\DQGHI¿FLHQF\RIWKH
CCMA is markedly different in other regions. My inclination, therefore, is to err on the side 
RIFDXWLRQDQGQRWDFFHSWWKHSUROLIHUDWLRQDQGQDWXUHRIWKHVHVWRULHVDVUHÀHFWLYHRIWKH
true nature of the CCMA. 
The frequent accusation that the CCMA is biased towards employees is, I believe, 
incorrect. I have seen a number of awards that go against employees that are shocking 
to say the least. The problem is not bias, but rather incompetence and inexperience. 
Training of CCMA commissioners, including the so-called senior commissioners, is a top 
SULRULW\DQGZRXOGGRPRUHIRUWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHODERXUPDUNHWWKDQPDQ\DPHQGPHQWV
to the LRA. 
It is important therefore that a thorough investigation is conducted into the functioning 
DQGHI¿FDF\RIWKH&&0$ZKLFKVKRXOGLQFOXGHDUHYLHZRIWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHDUELWUDWLRQ
DZDUGV,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKDWWKHLQHI¿FLHQF\DQGIXQFWLRQLQJRIVXFKDQLQVWLWXWLRQVKRXOG
be allowed to justify the erosion of workers’ substantive and procedural rights that are 
derived from the constitution. 
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Moreover, as Cheadle (1999) noted in his address to the 12th Annual Labour Law 
Conference:
“If the employer wishes to avail itself of the state machinery that costs 
nothing directly, it must be then prepared to expend the transaction time 
associated with the state justice system, just as it does if it seeks to recover 
GHEWV LQ WKHPDJLVWUDWH¶VFRXUW)RU ODUJHUHPSOR\HUVD ORZHU WUDQVDFWLRQ
and legal cost regime is relatively easy to devise either contractually or 
WKURXJKFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ´
I agree with these views. At the same time we should try to encourage other bodies 
to take on dispute resolution functions where this is appropriate and possible so that 
those that must use the CCMA, which are usually the unorganised and/or lower-level 
HPSOR\HHVREWDLQDQHI¿FLHQWVHUYLFH7KLVPHDQVWKDWZHOORUJDQLVHGVHFWRUVVXFKDV
retail, should have their own bargaining or statutory councils and they should not rely 
upon the CCMA for all their dispute resolution functions. The failure to establish councils 
in many sectors is a major problem that must be addressed by government and the other 
social partners. 
It also means that the CCMA should accredit private agencies with respect to dispute 
resolution services in terms of s 127 of the LRA, which to date it has not done. If private 
agencies were accredited, I suspect that more employers with unorganised employees 
and many middle and upper-level employees, would use their services instead of 
burdening the CCMA. 
Lastly, constant attention to the rules of the CCMA would also be useful, as I believe that 
the rules of procedure can assist in breaking a number of logjams. 
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 11. Labour Brokers
There has been a rapid growth in the past decade in the number and use of labour 
brokers.  This has caused a number of serious problems for workers. Some of the 
suggestions contained in this paper are drawn from Theron (2005). 
6HFWLRQRIWKH/5$XVHVWKHWHUPµWHPSRUDU\HPSOR\PHQWVHUYLFH¶7(6,WGH¿QHVLW
as:           
“any person who, for reward, procures or provides to a client other 
persons–         
(a) who render services to, or perform work for, the client; and  
E ZKRDUHUHPXQHUDWHGE\WKHWHPSRUDU\HPSOR\PHQWVHUYLFH´
One of the strange things about the term is the use of the word ‘temporary’ because it 
LVQRW LQFRQFHLYDEOH WKDW WKHSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHVFRXOGEH LQGH¿QLWH+RZHYHUPRVW
frequently services are provided on a temporary basis. 
Section 198(2) of the LRA makes it clear that the labour broker (or TES) is the employer 
of the workers and not the client.4  However, in terms of s 198(4) the client is jointly 
responsible with the labour broker if there is a contravention of: 
(i) a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council 
that regulates terms and conditions of employment; 
(ii) a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and conditions of employment;
(iii) the BCEA; or 
(iv) a sectoral determination.
4 In his article, Theron traces the origin of the legal notion in the new LRA that the labour broker, and not the client, is
 the employer of the workers, to the 1983 amendment to the definition of employee in the old LRA. In that amendment
 the broker was deemed to be the employer of workers that it placed with a client.
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Other labour statutes follow this trend. In s 82(3) of the BCEA, the TES and the client are 
jointly and severally liable if the TES, in respect of any employee who provides services to 
that client, does not comply with the BCEA or a sectoral determination. 
In s 57(2) of the EEA, if a TES commits an act of unfair discrimination on the express or 
implied instructions of a client, then both the client and the labour broker are jointly liable. 
The LRA does not contain a similar provision with regard to dismissals. For the purposes 
RIDI¿UPDWLYHDFWLRQSODQVVRIWKH(($GHHPVWKHHPSOR\HHWREHDQHPSOR\HHRI
WKHFOLHQWLIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VHPSOR\PHQWLVRIDQLQGH¿QLWHGXUDWLRQRUIRUDSHULRGRIWKUHH
months or longer.
7KHGH¿QLWLRQRIHPSOR\HH LQ WKH2FFXSDWLRQDO+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\$FW1RRI
(OHSA) excludes a labour broker. In contrast the provisions of the Mine Health and Safety 
Act No. 29 of 1996 apply to labour brokers. In my view there is a clear and problematic 
oversight in the OHSA. 
In essence, therefore, if there is a labour broker or TES, then there is a triangular 
relationship (as depicted in the diagram). The relationship between the labour broker and 
the workers is one of employment. The relationship between the labour broker and the 
client is regulated by commercial contract. The relationship between the client and the 
workers is governed by statute in terms of which the client is jointly and severally liable 
with the labour broker in respect of certain contraventions of labour related agreements, 
awards, statutes or sectoral determinations. Therefore, the client acquires the status of 
employer in certain circumstances.
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Client
Labour Broker Workers
Relationship
regulated by
commercial
contract
Relationship of Employment
“Partial employment relationship ”
In terms of s198 of the LRA Client and Labour
Broker are jointly and severally liable if either
contravene:
• Collective agreement concluded in a bargaining
council that regulates terms and conditions of
employment;
• Binding arbitration award that regulates terms
and conditions of employment
• The BCEA; or
• A provision of a sectoral determination
Similar provisions in other labour statutes: e.g.
s82 of the BCEA; s57 of the Employment Equity
Act
Employers seem to enter into labour broking arrangements for a number of reasons. 
The first is that they can extract lower wages and reduce the employee’s terms and 
conditions of employment. The typical example is that workers are presented with the 
employer’s business proposal to use a labour broker in terms of which the workers are 
offered alternative employment with the labour broker on reduced terms and conditions of 
employment. If they do not accept, they are retrenched.
The second reason is that the client escapes many of the obligations associated with 
being an employer, these obligations now being transferred to the labour broker. This 
includes the obligations associated with the right not to be unfairly dismissed. In practice, 
the labour broker seems more capable of escaping these obligations. For example, the 
labour broker can argue that the worker’s dismissal was for operational requirements 
because the client did not want that worker anymore, when clearly the ‘real’ reason for 
the dismissal may relate to the client’s view that the employee is performing poorly or has 
misconducted herself. An example of a clause in an agreement between labour broker 
and an employee states the following:       
“In the event of [the labour broker’s] clients, for any reason whatsoever, 
refusing to allow the employee on their premises, [the labour broker] will be 
entitled to terminate this agreement «´
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In essence, therefore, the client continues to perform many of the functions of an 
employer such as directing how and when work will be done, interviewing prospective 
employees, etc. In fact, if one surveys many of the agreements between labour broker 
and employee, on the one hand, and labour broker and client, on the other, the labour 
broker is in truth not the employer, but merely an ‘intermediary’ and the client enjoys most 
of the rights associated with an employer. As Theron remarks “[t]he client thus determines 
WKHSDUDPHWHUVRI WKHUHODWLRQVKLSDQG LVGRPLQDQW LQ WKHUHODWLRQVKLS´ Theron, 2005: 
619).
The effect of labour broking arrangements upon workers is problematic. It usually means 
DGHFUHDVHLQZDJHVDQGDUHGXFWLRQLQWHUPVDQGFRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQWDQGEHQH¿WV
,WXVXDOO\LQYROYHVWUDQVIRUPLQJWKHFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQWIURPLQGH¿QLWHWRWHPSRUDU\
RU¿[HG WHUPFRQWUDFWV1R ORQJHU LV WKHHPSOR\HHZRUNLQJ IRUD UHSXWDEOHFRPSDQ\
EXWVXGGHQO\ IRUVRPHODERXUEURNHUPDQ\RIZKRPDUH µÀ\E\QLJKWV¶VRPHRIZKRP
operate from the boot of a car. The union’s capacity to organise and bargain collectively 
is diminished. The worker’s capacity to challenge an unfair dismissal is also detrimentally 
DIIHFWHGHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQ LWFRPHV WR UHLQVWDWHPHQWDZDUGV6RPHWLPHVHYHQ¿QGLQJ
WKHUHJLVWHUHGRI¿FHRIWKHODERXUEURNHULVGLI¿FXOW7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVRWKHUSUREOHPV
It is safe to conclude that labour brokers have given birth to an underclass of employed 
workers.
It is evident that s 198 of the LRA and the similar provisions in the other labour related 
VWDWXWHVKDYHQRWVXI¿FLHQWO\SURWHFWHGZRUNHUVSODFHGE\ODERXUEURNHUVDQGWKDWUHIRUP
is essential and urgent. 
I believe that it would be appropriate to recognise the true reality and change the notion 
in s 198 to state that the broker is the intermediary for placing employees in the service of 
the client and it is the client, not the labour broker, who is the employer. It may then still be 
necessary to regulate the role of the intermediary, but that would be a far simpler task. 
2IFRXUVH WKHGLI¿FXOW\ZLWK WKLV LV WKHHIIHFW WKDW LWZLOOKDYHRQ WKHJHQXLQH7(6WKDW
sends, for example, a domestic worker to do some ironing for an afternoon, or, that sends 
a temporary secretary to a business for three days to help out with urgent work. It seems 
unfair to make the client the employer in those circumstances. This TES and client is in 
a very different position to the company that permanently ‘outsources’ its employees to 
DODERXUEURNHUDQGHQWHUVLQWR¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVZLWKWKHODERXUEURNHUIRUVD\RQHWR
three years. 
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In order to resolve this problem I suggest that the law introduce a cut-off of say three 
months in any 12-month period. In other words, if the client procures an employee from 
a labour broker for more than three months in any 12-month period, then the client will 
EHUHJDUGHGDVWKHHPSOR\HU ,QRUGHUWRSUHYHQWVXFFHVVLYH¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVRI MXVW
below three months, the stipulation of a 12-month period is necessary. This kind of cut-off 
SHULRGLVDOUHDG\SUHVHQWLQVRIWKH(($ZKLFKGHDOVZLWKDI¿UPDWLYHDFWLRQSODQV
The alternative is to make the client at least jointly and severally liable for the dismissal 
of workers and any unfair labour practices. Another, albeit weaker alternative, would be 
to provide that if the TES dismisses unfairly or commits an unfair labour practice on the 
express or implied instructions of the client, then the client and broker are jointly and 
VHYHUDOO\OLDEOH7KLVLVVLPLODUWRWKHSURYLVLRQLQVRIWKH(($7KHGLI¿FXOW\ZLWKD
SURYLVLRQRIWKLVQDWXUHLVWKHGLI¿FXOW\RISURYLQJWKHH[SUHVVRULPSOLHGLQVWUXFWLRQ
Another alternative is to regulate the conduct of the client and the kind of contractual 
relationship that may be entered into between the client and the broker, making it 
impermissible, for example, for the client to act in ways that would cause unfair labour 
practices or an unfair dismissal. In that sense, the client’s liability would be extended. 
This might put pay to the client acting unfairly and then hiding behind the broker, with 
the broker justifying the dismissal on its so-called operational requirements. This is a 
weaker alternative, as it does not deal with workers’ diminished collective bargaining and 
organisational capacity, which results from the use of a labour broker. 
It also seems to me that if labour brokers are to stay, they should be required to register 
with the Department of Labour, as was the case with the old LRA, and abide by a Code 
of Conduct. Through this process the brokers could be required to provide a registered 
address, which would make declaring disputes against them easier. Moreover, labour 
brokers should be regulated so that the unscrupulous ones can be deregistered. It may 
not be the solution to all problems, but it would at least provide the Department with 
the potential to root out some of the bad apples. I believe that the ILO Convention 181 
recommends registration and already there is some kind of registration of employment 
service providers in s 24 of the Skills Development Act (SDA), albeit that this is for a 
different purpose. 
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 12. Other Atypical Workers
A key issue for the future relates to atypical workers, who are vulnerable workers. This 
issue deals with the quality of an employee’s job and a person’s long-term job security. 
This issue has been on the agenda for some time, but it seems that South Africa has been 
slow to develop regulations on this issue.
Atypical workers include:
L &DVXDOZRUNHUV7KH\DUHHPSOR\HHVZKRKDYHVHSDUDWH¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWV
normally for a day at a time such that they are offered employment on 
an intermittent basis. They are often referred to as stand-by workers.
LL 7HPSRUDU\HPSOR\HHV7KH\DUHHPSOR\HGIRUDVSHFL¿FDQGXVXDOO\VKRUW
SHULRGRIWLPH7KHLUFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQWDUH¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWV
(iii) Part-time employees. They are employees who are employed 
on a continuous basis although not on a full time basis. 
There are combinations of these types of employees such as casual part-time 
employment, etc. These kinds of contracts usually do not have benefits attached to 
them such as retirement funds, medical aid funds and the like. Most importantly, they are 
frequently devoid of any kind of long-term job security. Casuals and temporary employees 
are used widely by large enterprises, especially in the retail sector. 
There are also ‘dependent contractors’, but I will deal with them in the next section. 
I believe that on the legislative front we need to explore the following: 
Casual or temporary employees in certain sectors should be guaranteed a minimum 
amount of pay. In other words, if temporary employees are called in for some Saturdays 
in a month and they are not sure which Saturdays and how many they will be called in 
for, then some arrangement must be made such that they are guaranteed at least some 
pay per month irrespective of the number of Saturdays they are called in for. This allows 
employees to be guaranteed some kind of income and to gain some kind of security. A 
minimum rate of pay should also be prescribed.
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The best way to do this would be to allow such minima to be set by appropriate sectoral 
bargaining councils or through sectoral determinations. But, given the weak state of our 
bargaining council system and the limited capacity of trade unions to bargain on behalf of 
these workers, the Minister should be empowered to make sectoral determinations even if 
a bargaining council in that sector has not agreed to the minima for these workers. 
$VUHJDUGV¿[HGWHUPFRQWUDFWVLHWHPSRUDU\ZRUNHUVWKHUHVKRXOGEHVRPHSURYLVLRQ
as I believe there is in the Dutch legislation and other jurisdictions, that if an employer 
enters into a number of consecutive temporary employment contracts, say three or more, 
RUWKHHPSOR\HHKDVEHHQLQWHPSRUDU\HPSOR\PHQWIRUD¿[HGSHULRGRIWLPHZKLFKFRXOG
vary depending on the level of the employee and the sector, then the temporary contract 
FRQYHUWV LWVHOI LQWRSHUPDQHQWDUUDQJHPHQWV ,Q WKHGH¿QLWLRQRIGLVPLVVDO WKHUH LVD
presumption that if a person was given a reasonable expectation of continued temporary 
HPSOR\PHQWDQGWKDWH[SHFWDWLRQLVQRWIXO¿OOHGWKHQLWPD\DPRXQWWRDGLVPLVVDO7KLVLV
QRWVXI¿FLHQW
Moreover, it would be useful to specify exactly what an employer may use temporary or 
¿[HGWHUPHPSOR\HHVIRU)RUH[DPSOHLWPD\EHIRUDWHPSRUDU\LQFUHDVHLQZRUN7KLV
would prevent the continual use of temporary employees for normal work; in such a case 
WKHHPSOR\HHVKRXOGKDYHDFRQWUDFWRILQGH¿QLWHGXUDWLRQ
,QRUGHUWRGHDOZLWKWKHSUREOHPVRI LQÀH[LELOLW\ WKDWPD\EHFDXVHG,VXJJHVW WKDW WKLV
apply only to blue-collar workers, where the problems of casualisation are prevalent. 
This could be done by making the provisions subject to an earnings’ threshold that is 
commensurate to the threshold determined in terms of s 6(3) of the BCEA, which is at 
present R115 572 per annum (See Government Gazette 25012, 14 March 2003).
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 13. The Application of Labour Legislation to Workers
When we speak of the employee, not only do we refer to all levels of employees from the 
CEO to the labourer, but we also refer to skilled and unskilled workers and workers in 
GLIIHUHQWVHFWRUVFDWHJRULHVDQGW\SHVRIZRUN7KHµRQHVL]H¿WVDOO¶DSSURDFKWR ODERXU
legislation does not lend itself to an easily adaptable labour market, because a relaxation 
in terms and conditions of employment for one employee may be appropriate in one 
context, but in another context it may threaten the security of employment and basic 
fairness of the employee’s conditions of employment. 
With the changing nature and structure of workplaces, global competition, changes in the 
nature of ownership of enterprises and the way in which work is arranged, it may well be 
WKDWWKHµRQHVL]H¿WVDOO¶DSSURDFKWRODERXUODZLVLQDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHIXWXUH
If we acknowledge this, then we need to consider the protections provided to different 
NLQGVRIHPSOR\HHVDQGDVNRXUVHOYHVZKHWKHU WKH\DUHVXI¿FLHQW ,Q WKLVSURFHVVZH
need to be guided by the principle that the vulnerable, powerless and disadvantaged need 
to be protected. This means that we need to extend protections to workers who do not 
KDYHWKHVHSURWHFWLRQVDQGZKRDUH LQVXI¿FLHQWO\SURWHFWHGE\WKHSUHVHQWGLVSHQVDWLRQ
dependent workers, who for one reason or another are classified as independent 
contractors, workers working for labour brokers, casuals, temporary employees, etc. 
But it may also mean that certain employees need to surrender some of their protections 
such as senior management, other white-collar employees and newly hired employees. 
The question is to what extent should they surrender their protections. I have already 
addressed the issue of newly hired employees, casuals and temporary employees. I also 
consider the latter in the section dealing with collective bargaining. 
13.1 Dependent Contractors
A good example of a dependent contractor, which is prevalent in the transport sector, is 
the owner-driver. What usually happens is that the company retrenches its drivers and 
then it enters into a commercial contract with each of the drivers. It makes them buy their 
trucks. It arranges a loan for the driver from a bank and stands as surety. The owner-
driver then transports the company’s goods at a standard rate. Usually all the work is 
provided by the one business. 
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Employers claim that the main reason for this type of scheme is that it promotes 
productivity. The owner-driver, who is no longer an employee but an independent 
contractor, does not take as much leave, the driver works many hours of overtime, etc 
without being limited by the BCEA. The owner-driver determines her own hours of work. 
The implications for the health and safety of the owner-driver and for safety on our roads 
are ominous. 
Dependent contractors are widely used in many sectors, including domestic, textile, motor, 
engineering and transport. In most instances they are called ‘independent contractors’ 
and are therefore not subject to the protections afforded employees under labour-related 
statutes.
The term ‘independent’ is misleading. The contractors are utterly dependent on the 
business with which they contract. They must accept the terms and conditions upon which 
that work is provided to them because they are unable to use collective bargaining as a 
means of redressing the power imbalance between them and the business with which 
they contract. They are ‘dependent contractors’. 
S 200A of the LRA and s 83A of the BCEA sets out a test for when a worker is an 
independent contractor or an employee. It presumes that a worker is an employee if one 
or more factors indicating an employment relationship are present. These factors were 
drawn from the common law. The presumption is rebuttable and only applies to workers 
earning below the threshold prescribed in s 6(3) of the BCEA. 
These sections have assisted in curtailing the crude attempts by some employers allied 
to the Confederation of Employers’ Organisation (COFESA) to reclassify their employees 
as independent contractors. But these sections have not solved the problem of the 
‘dependent contractor’, who is technically not an employee as contemplated by the labour 
statutes.
In terms of s 55(4)(k) of the BCEA the Minister may specify in a sectoral determination 
that minimum conditions of employment for persons other than employees. For example, 
the Sectoral Determination for the Domestic Sector applies to all persons employed in 
domestic work, whether they are employees or independent contractors. 
The use of the word ‘employment’ in this subsection is a misnomer because strictly 
speaking dependent contractors are not ‘employed’. It should probably be replaced with 
the word ‘work’, which connotes a broader concept. However, despite this wording, this 
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section probably does cover ‘dependent contractors’. 
The other problem with this section is that the Minister cannot specify minimum terms 
of employment, only conditions of employment. In this regard it is apposite to contrast s 
55(4)(a) of the BCEA, which refers to both terms and conditions of employment, and s 
55(4)(k), which refers only to conditions of work. This presumably prevents the Minister 
from setting minimum rates of remuneration for persons other than employees, which is a 
term as opposed to a condition of work. This is problematic. The section should, therefore, 
be broadened to include the concept of ‘terms of work’.
By virtue of s 83 of the BCEA the Minister has the power to deem any category of persons 
to be employees for purposes of the whole or part of the BCEA, any other employment 
law or any sectoral determination. The Minister also has the power to deem any category 
of persons to be contributors for the purposes of the whole or part of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act No. 63 of 2001. A similar provision is found in s 1(2) of the OHSA.
This is a valuable section. However, as far as I know, to date the Minister has not deemed 
any category of persons, such as the dependent contractor, an employee for the purpose 
of the BCEA or any other employment law. This is a grave omission. I believe that it is 
critical that dependent contractors be brought within the protections of the labour-related 
statutes. In many respects there is no difference between an employee and a dependent 
contractor. 
Other countries have gone a different route. In Sweden the concept of dependent 
FRQWUDFWRULVLQFOXGHGLQWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIHPSOR\HH
“For the purposes of this Act a person shall be regarded as an employee 
even if no normal engagement exists, provided that he performs work for 
another person and thereby occupies in relation to that person a position of 
dependence essentially similar to that occupied by an employee in relation 
WRKLVHPSOR\HU´
,Q&DQDGD WKHGH¿QLWLRQRIHPSOR\HHKDVDOVREHHQH[SDQGHG WR LQFOXGH WKHFRQFHSW
RI µGHSHQGHQWFRQWUDFWRU¶ ,Q LQWHUSUHWLQJ WKHGH¿QLWLRQ WKH&DQDGLDQ/DERXU5HODWLRQV
Boards dealt with individuals who were in similar circumstances as the owner-driver. The 
Boards have found the owner-drivers to be dependent contractors and therefore part of 
WKHH[SDQGHGGH¿QLWLRQRIHPSOR\HH,QWKHFDVHRI)RZQHV&RQVWXFWLRQ&R/WG [1974] 1 
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Can. L.R.B.R. 453 (B.C.) at pp 461-2 the British Columbia Labour Relations Board found 
that:
L WKHDFWXDOSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHLUZRUNRUVHUYLFHV¿WVLQWRWKHVDPH
rotation as the employee-driver, in that they drive the same route 
and are subject to the same supervision and control;
(ii) owner-drivers are paid the same standard rate as employees although the 
driver’s rate is considerably higher because he rents his truck and his services;
(iii) there is little room for entrepreneurial judgment or initiative 
WKDWPLJKWUHVXOWLQH[WUDSUR¿WVRUORVVHV
The Ontario Board in the case of Nelson Crushed Stone [1997] O.L.R.B Rep. Feb. 104 
held that the purpose of this amendment was to address the mischief created by persons 
who may “manifest the trappings of independent entrepreneurs but who in an intrinsic 
VHQVHDUHFOHDUO\LQVXFKDVXEVHUYLHQWHFRQRPLFSRVLWLRQYLVjYLVWKHEHQH¿FLDU\RIKLV
services that he ought to be extended the protection intended by the collective bargaining 
SURFHVV´.
The Board has also held that the word ‘dependent’ must be interpreted in a manner 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHHFRQRPLFUHDOLW\RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHEHQH¿FLDU\RIWKHVHUYLFH
In the case of Algoquin Tavern and CLC, Loc. 1689 (Re) [1981] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 337 
(Ont.) the Ontario Labour Relations Board has listed 11 indicators that it considers when 
determining dependency. These are:
(i) “the right to use substitutes in method of work performance;
(ii) ownership of tools and supply of materials;
(iii) evidence of entrepreneurial activity;
(iv) the selling of one’s own services on the market generally;
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(v) economic mobility or independence – the freedom to refuse a job;
(vi) evidence of variation in fees charged;
(vii) organisational integration;
(viii) degree of specialisation, skill, expertise and creativity;
(ix) control in the manner of performance of work;
(x) magnitude if the contract and manner of payment; and
(xi) the rendering of services under the same conditions as employees.” 
Numerous other Canadian cases have considered the concept of ‘dependence’. I do not 
intend to review all the cases except to note that there have been different opinions from 
the Labour Boards about whether the owner-driver who employs others are dependent 
contractors. See in this regard Bronwin Harvey Ltd&//&1ÀG/5%
Canada Crushed Stone [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. Dec.806 and Dominion Diaries Ltd [1978] 
O.L.R.B. Rep. Dec. 1085
The German approach is to provide dependent contractors some, but not all, of the 
protections afforded to employees. Obviously, this would go some way to protecting 
owner-drivers where they are deemed to be dependent contractors, although it would 
depend on the nature and extent of the protections provided to them. 
I believe that the Minister should use his powers in terms of s 83 of the BCEA to deem 
dependent contractors employees for the purposes of employment legislation. The above 
cases would be a useful guide in the formulation of the notice. If it is inappropriate to use 
s 83 for the purpose of extending labour statutes to dependent contractors, then I believe 
that we should pursue the Canadian and Swedish approach by including the concept of 
GHSHQGHQWFRQWUDFWRUZLWKLQWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIHPSOR\HH
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13.2 Levels of Employees
6HQLRUH[HFXWLYHVZKR LQFOXGHVHQLRUJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVQHHGYHU\ OLWWOHSURWHFWLRQ
from the labour laws. They are usually well protected by the common law of contract, their 
contracts containing clauses such as notice periods of between three and twelve months. 
Their bargaining power is not comparable to the unskilled and semi-skilled blue-collar 
worker. In my experience the kinds of packages they are paid out when their services are 
terminated are handsome to say the least. Moreover, their employment security is less 
WKUHDWHQHGDVWKH\DUHDEOHWR¿QGDOWHUQDWLYHHPSOR\PHQWDORWHDVLHU
A bad CEO can cause havoc within an organisation, and accordingly, termination needs 
WREHVZLIW0RUHRYHULID&(2RUVHQLRUH[HFXWLYHKDVORVWWKHFRQ¿GHQFHRIKHU%RDUG
or other mandating structure, then there is no reason for her to remain. But the labour law 
with its requirement for a fair dismissal often forestalls this unnecessarily. I believe that 
senior executives should be excluded from the ambit of labour legislation. It would make 
WKHODERXUPDUNHWPRUHÀH[LEOHZKHUHLWUHDOO\UHTXLUHVÀH[LELOLW\
The one difficulty will be how senior executive is defined. I believe a remuneration 
threshold is perhaps necessary as well as some objective factor indicating that the 
position is a senior position. It is important to note that in other countries, such as Canada, 
labour legislation does not apply to the upper levels of employees. 
This raises the question of where the cut-off should be. We need to consider the question 
bearing in mind that it is necessary to protect the vulnerable and powerless. 
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 14. Collective Bargaining
This is a complex issue. In 2000 the Department of Labour proposed amendments to the 
LRA dealing with collective bargaining, which evoked substantive opposition from labour. 
,VKDOOQRWGHDOZLWK WKHVH LVVXHVVSHFL¿FDOO\EXWPHUHO\FRQFHQWUDWHRQ WKHSURSRVDOV
made by Cheadle. 
$V&KHDGOHVWDWHVDW WKHRXWVHW WKH/5$¶VSROLF\FKRLFHZDVWZRIROG7KH¿UVWZDV WR
strengthen and expand the coverage of sector level bargaining and to give bargaining 
councils the role of regulating bargaining at the level of the workplace. The second was to 
provide for a system of voluntarism. This represented a massive compromise for labour, 
which had campaigned for a system of compulsory centralised collective bargaining. 
As far as I know the business constituency, although united in its rejection of labour’s 
demand, was divided, with some employers preferring a voluntary system of collective 
bargaining at workplace level. 
14.1 Sector Level Bargaining
&KHDGOH LGHQWL¿HV WKUHHSUREOHPVZLWKZKLFK ,DJUHH7KH¿UVWSUREOHPUHODWHV WR WKH
fragmentary nature of bargaining councils, with most workplaces not covered by sectoral 
EDUJDLQLQJ7KLVSLFWXUHLVFRQ¿UPHGE\WKHUHSRUWRI*RGIUH\0DUHHDQG7KHURQ
Cheadle criticises the Department of Labour post 1996, for having failed to convene 
meetings of employer organisations and trade unions operating in the same sector to 
commence and facilitate a process for the establishment and consolidation of councils. 
The second problem relates to the lack of a broad demarcation of sectors, which should 
have been done by the social partners at NEDLAC. 
The third problem is that most bargaining councils have not performed their envisaged 
functions beyond setting terms and conditions of employment. Many have not set 
sectoral policies and little has been done in respect of industrial support services and the 
extension of the bargaining council’s services and functions to the informal sector and 
KRPHZRUNHUV,QWKLVUHJDUG&KHDGOHLGHQWL¿HVWKDWWKHUHLVDIDLOXUHWRSURYLGHVXEVLGLHV
to councils in order that they may give effect to their many roles. The Department needs 
to develop programmes to assist councils to implement their new functions.
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These problems demonstrate how changing legislation does not necessarily resolve 
the problem. We need an activist Department and social partners that drive the 
implementation of these matters.
Cheadle also criticises the labour movement for not agreeing to the possibility of the 
Minister of Labour promulgating sectoral determinations, whose terms and conditions are 
less favourable than those contained in the BCEA. But labour’s position was, however, 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOH7KH\GLGQRWZDQWWKHÀRRURIULJKWVFRQWDLQHGLQWKH%&($WREHFDSDEOH
of being undermined and were not willing to hand over a broad power to the Minister 
on this. They feared that in future years another Minister might simply use this power to 
undermine workers’ legitimate rights. Perhaps it would be better to discuss the sectors 
where less favourable terms and conditions are appropriate, rather than negotiate a broad 
DQGJHQHUDOSRZHUWRWKH0LQLVWHU,IWKH\DUHDSSURSULDWHWKHQVSHFL¿FH[FHSWLRQVFRXOG
be written into the legislation. This might not be the tidiest way legally of dealing with the 
LVVXHEXW LWZRXOGUHPRYHWKHGHEDWHIURPWKHDEVWUDFWZKHUHIHDUVDUHGLI¿FXOWWRGHDO
with, to the concrete, where workers can readily see what they are in for. 
Cheadle criticises sectoral agreements for setting actual wages and not minima. He 
believes that the sectors should set framework agreements and that actuals be determined 
at the level of the workplace. His criticism is based upon a survey of bargaining council 
agreements. I am not aware that the determination of actuals is as commonplace as he 
alleges. In their study Godfrey, Maree and Theron conclude that “[t]he main agreements 
RIFRXQFLOVDOVRGLIIHU6RPHDUH ORQJDQGH[WUHPHO\FRPSOH[ IXOORI LQWULFDFLHVEXLOWXS
RYHU\HDUVRIQHJRWLDWLRQVZKLOHRWKHUVDUHUHODWLYHO\VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG7KHVDPHDSSOLHVWR
VWDI¿QJDQGEHQH¿WIXQGVZKLFKYDU\FRQVLGHUDEO\IURPFRXQFLOWRFRXQFLO´
Moreover, in some sectors the negotiations of actuals is probably appropriate. In the 
motor (as opposed to auto) sector, actuals have been negotiated as a percentage. In 
other words, the parties agreed to a percentage increase on whatever the employees in 
that sector were earning. This was because the minima were so low and many workers 
were in fact earning way above that. Negotiations about minima therefore only affected a 
IHZZRUNHUV1HJRWLDWLRQVDWSODQWOHYHOLQWKDWVHFWRUDUHDOVRYHU\GLI¿FXOWEHFDXVHRIWKH
large number of workplaces – just think about the number of petrol stations. 
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14.2 Extension of Collective Agreements
Cheadle argues that the Minister should have a greater discretion on whether or not 
to extend collective agreements even if the parties are representative or sufficiently 
representative. In broad terms he envisages a situation where the Minister can refuse 
an extension if the agreement is not aligned with the government’s labour market policy. 
He believes that there are two ways in which the parties to the agreement would be 
SURWHFWHGIURPWKH0LQLVWHUDEXVLQJKLVSRZHU7KH¿UVW LV WKDW WKH ODERXUPDUNHWSROLF\
would have to be negotiated at NEDLAC, and the second is the constitutional right to fair 
administrative action. 
The Minister of Labour made a proposal of this nature in the run up to the 2002 LRA 
amendments. The unions fiercely opposed it. Another proposal of this nature will be 
controversial.
The question is on what grounds may a representative sector’s wishes be undermined, 
and if it is, do they have adequate protections. My primary legal concern is really with 
the adequacy of the protections. Labour market policies negotiated at NEDLAC will no 
doubt be broad and general in nature. This, in turn, will mean that the reasons for not 
extending an agreement may also be broad and general in nature. Courts in review 
proceedings are reluctant to interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless 
there is patent unfairness, illegality or irrationality. In many cases the courts are likely to 
say that it all comes down to a difference in the interpretation of, and emphasis given to, 
the policy, and that accordingly it is unable to interfere with the decision. In other words, 
reviews of this nature protect the parties from extreme or irrational abuse. They do not 
prevent the Minister from effectively entering into the bargaining process under the guise 
of administrative processes. Moreover, in reality a review process of this nature is time 
consuming and could effectively delay the wage increases of workers for many months. 
I believe that a proposal of this nature can only be introduced if there are adequate and 
VXI¿FLHQWSURWHFWLRQV IURP0LQLVWHULDO LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ WKHEDUJDLQLQJSURFHVV ,GRQRW
believe that participation in the process of drafting the government’s labour market policy 
and the general right to review administrative decisions are adequate. 
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14.3 Sector Level Bargaining and Atypical Workers
Cheadle correctly argues that the only form of collective bargaining that will give atypical 
workers, including dependent workers, a voice is sector level bargaining. But he argues 
that it is important for the bargaining councils to conclude agreements that are appropriate 
for this form of employment, and accordingly the Minister should have the discretion not to 
extend them if they fall outside of an agreed policy frame. He suggests that if there are no 
collective agreements for these workers, then the Minister should be empowered to make 
sectoral determinations covering atypical workers. 
The idea of giving these workers a collective voice through sectoral collective bargaining 
and protecting them through sectoral determinations is appealing. The question of a 
broad ministerial discretion to refuse to extend a collective agreement setting minimum 
conditions of employment for atypical workers will throw up serious concerns for the trade 
union movement. I also believe that in many situations it may be necessary to proceed 
by way of sectoral determinations because atypical workers are generally difficult to 
organise, and consequently collective bargaining may not produce the required results. 
14.4 Collective Bargaining and Small Business
What would the effect be of some kind of blanket exemption for small business from 
bargaining council collective agreements that are extended by the Minister, as was 
suggested by the President in his opening address to Parliament at the beginning of 
"7KHTXHVWLRQLVGLI¿FXOWWRDQVZHUSUHFLVHO\LQWKHDEVHQFHRIDFOHDUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the nature of the intended blanket exemption; however, in general, the fear that it would 
seriously undermine sectoral collective bargaining must be legitimate and reasonable. 
7KH¿UVWTXHVWLRQWKDWQHHGVWREHDQVZHUHGLVZK\WKLVLVQHFHVVDU\,ILWLVPRWLYDWHGE\
the desire for increased job creation, then it will have to be cogently shown that quality 
jobs will be created by this move. It may merely mean less favourable conditions of 
employment for a vast number of workers, whose bargaining power is already limited due 
WRWKHIDFWWKDWLWLVZHOONQRZQWKDWLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRRUJDQLVHZRUNHUVLQVPDOOEXVLQHVVHV
The second issue that needs consideration is the effect that it will have upon the 
bargaining council system as a whole. Fewer and fewer small businesses will see the 
need to become parties to the council because they know that they will be exempt 
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anyway. This would be disastrous for an already fragile bargaining council system. 
Moreover, in many cases sectoral collective bargaining is in the interests of small 
business, as it removes this time consuming function from the workplace level where the 
employer would be forced to deal with the issue directly. 
It may, therefore, be better to explore more thoroughly the issue of small business 
representation on the councils. Section 30(1)(b) of the LRA requires a bargaining council 
constitution to provide for the representation of small and medium enterprises on the 
council. The LRA, therefore, already gives small and medium businesses the opportunity 
WRLQÀXHQFHWKHQDWXUHRIFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWV
The notion that big business drives sectoral collective bargaining is not true. The picture 
that emerges from the study by Godfrey, Maree and Theron (2006) is very different from 
that. They state that “the data shows that in the vast majority of cases the party employers 
RQFRXQFLOVDUHRQDYHUDJHODUJHUWKDQWKHQRQSDUW\HPSOR\HUVLQHPSOR\PHQWWHUPV´.
They also state that it ³«LVVRPHZKDWVXUSULVLQJ«WKDWRYHUDOOSDUW\HPSOR\HUVDUHQRW
SDUWLFXODUO\ELJWKHDYHUDJHVL]H LVHPSOR\HHVDQGWKH\GRQRWRXWZHLJKQRQSDUW\
¿UPVE\YHU\PXFKWKHODWHUHPSOR\RQDYHUDJHHPSOR\HHV´  Noting that there are of 
exceptions in some of the big national councils, they conclude that the ³«GDWDVKRZV«
WKDWWKHEDUJDLQLQJFRXQFLOV\VWHPSUHGRPLQDQWO\FRYHUVIDLUO\VPDOO¿UPV´.
Notwithstanding this, it is evident that greater work could be done by employers’ 
organisations to organise small businesses and make their voice heard in the bargaining 
process. The same could be said of trade unions and the organisation of employees from 
small businesses. We cannot legislate this. But perhaps what we can look at is the way in 
which the employer side of the table at bargaining councils is organised and try and make 
sure that small business is better represented. 
Godfrey, Maree and Theron (2006) point out that on some of the councils “the employers 
had nominated one or two employer representatives to specifically represent small 
business interests on the council” where there were no employers’ organisations that 
specifically represented small business. They also state that “the councils indicated 
that the small business representatives did actually try to represent small business 
interests and in most cases the representation was seen as effective.”  Despite this, 
it seems unsatisfactory that an employer representative, who is not in some way 
directly accountable to small business, is simply allocated to represent the interests 
of small business. The exigencies of the particular situation may require it. However, 
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the Department or Registrar of Labour Relations should be empowered to evaluate 
the manner in which small business representation is given effect to in the council’s 
constitution as well as require better quality representation from small business where this 
is possible. 
The other issue is the issue of exemptions as they presently exist. Section 32(3)(e) 
of the LRA allows the Minister of Labour to refuse to extend a collective agreement 
concluded in the bargaining council to a non-party if the agreement does not provide for 
an independent body to hear and decide appeals against a councils’ decision to refuse 
an exemption or withdraw it. Section 32(3)(f) allows the minister to refuse to extend 
such a collective agreement to a non-party where it does not contain the criteria that the 
exemption body must apply. The criteria for exemptions must be fair and promote the 
primary objects of the LRA. 
The picture painted by Godfrey, Maree and Theron (2006) about exemptions and small 
business seems to be that in general the system is working. The number of exemption 
applications during 2000 to 2004 increased and the success rate was above 70per cent. 
They also found that the total number of appeals was low. Furthermore, in some councils 
there were dedicated exemption procedures for small businesses and even blanket 
exemption procedures for small businesses that were registered with the council. They 
quote the “Furniture (Northern Region) bargaining council, which provides for the phasing 
LQRIQHZ¿UPVWKDWKDYHRUOHVVHPSOR\HHVWRIXOOFRPSOLDQFHRYHUDSHULRGRIDERXW
WKUHH\HDUV”
In the light of the above, it is unclear why the law needs to provide for further exemptions 
for small business from collective agreements that are extended by the Minister of Labour.
Nevertheless, insofar as there are exemptions for small business from collective 
DJUHHPHQWV WKDWDUHH[WHQGHGE\ WKH0LQLVWHUDTXHVWLRQ WKDWZLOOEHGLI¿FXOW WRGHDO
ZLWKZLOOEHKRZDVPDOOEXVLQHVVLVGH¿QHG6KRXOGLWEHE\QXPEHURIHPSOR\HHVRUE\
turnover?
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 15. Amending Terms and Conditions of Employment
The facts in the case of Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
& others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC); National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v 
Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) raise an important issue about collective 
bargaining. In that case the employer wanted to change its shift patterns i.e. amend 
its employees’ terms and conditions of employment with regard to hours of work. It 
negotiated with the union, but could not obtain an agreement. It then threatened the 
retrenchment of the workers who would not agree to the employer’s demand and invited 
the union to consult about the matter. In effect, the employer transformed a normal 
collective bargaining issue into a consultative issue relating to dismissals for operational 
requirements. The union challenged the threat of dismissals in the Labour Court as 
constituting an infringement of s 187(1)(c) of the LRA, which provides that a dismissal is 
automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is to compel the employee to accept 
a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee. 
The Labour Court upheld the interdict application, but the LAC overturned it on appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the union’s application for leave to appeal 
and endorsed the LAC’s approach, and the Constitutional Court dismissed the union’s 
application for leave to appeal without providing any reasons. 
The LAC interpreted s 187(1)(c) as if it outlawed ‘lock-out dismissals’, as they were known 
under the old LRA. A lock-out dismissal is a dismissal of a worker with an undertaking 
to re-employ, if the worker later accepts the employer’s demand. The LAC held that the 
company’s threatened dismissals were intended to be final dismissals and were not 
intended to be conditional dismissals i.e. if the employee accepted the employer’s demand 
after the due date for acceptance of the new terms and conditions of employment, she 
would not be re-instated. 
The courts’ judgments do not adequately deal with the fundamental issue; namely, 
the manner in which collective bargaining is undermined by the employer’s decision 
to threaten dismissals for operational requirements. If Fry’s Metals could do it in order 
to amend terms and conditions of employment with regard to hours of work, which is 
traditionally an issue for collective bargaining, then it is possible that another employer 
could threaten dismissals if the workers do not accede to the employer’s wage demands. 
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All the employer need do is classify its demand as an operational requirement and the 
employer can transform the collective bargaining process into a consultation about 
possible retrenchments. Given the broad manner in which our courts have interpreted 
WKHQRWLRQRIDQRSHUDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQW LQFOXGLQJ WKHGHVLUH IRU LQFUHDVHGSUR¿WV LW
ZRXOGQRWEHGLI¿FXOW WRDUJXHWKDWPRVWGHPDQGVFRXOGHDVLO\FRQVWLWXWHDQRSHUDWLRQDO
requirement. Put differently, the employer is now able to introduce a threat of dismissal 
into the negotiations about collective bargaining issues. This undermines collective 
bargaining and the right to strike.
Collective bargaining has always been the preferred mechanism for resolving disputes 
about wages and other terms and conditions of employment. It is imperative therefore 
that the sanctity of collective bargaining be protected, and accordingly amendments to the 
LRA are necessary. 
I therefore suggest that s 187(1)(c) of the LRA be amended to read:
“A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the 
HPSOR\HHDFWVFRQWUDU\WRVHFWLRQRULIWKHUHDVRQIRUWKHGLVPLVVDOLV²
«
[to compel the employee] the employee’s refusal to accept a demand in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee;
…”5
5 Bold in square brackets represents a deletion; underlying represents an addition
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 16. Conclusion
$V,VWDWHGULJKWDWWKHEHJLQQLQJWKHUHLVQRTXLFN¿[IRUVPDOOEXVLQHVV:HQHHGWRKDYH
a balanced approach that caters for the interests of all stakeholders. 
We need to approach the law bearing in mind the different kinds of employers and 
redraft the Codes and law with this in mind. Similarly, we need to recognise that there 
are different kinds of workers, some deserving of greater protection and others, such as 
senior executives, deserving of less protection. We need to ensure that the vulnerable, 
powerless and disadvantaged are afforded greater protection. We must improve the 
capacity of all stakeholders to voice their interests in the structures and processes of 
collective bargaining. But at the same time, we all need to be realistic and recognise that 
this may require trade offs. 
I believe that it is necessary to broaden the scope and content of legal protection for 
workers of labour brokers, dependent workers, casuals and other temporary employees. 
Other key issues that require legislative amendment are ones that bolster the sanctity of 
collective bargaining when it comes to issues such as amending terms and conditions of 
work and clarify the law regarding dismissals for operational requirements. 
As regards the residual unfair labour practice, dismissals for misconduct and incapacity, 
dismissals for operational requirements, newly hired or probationary employees, there 
may be ways to streamline the regulation of these issues such that the labour market 
EHFRPHVPRUHHI¿FLHQWDQGZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVDUHQRWWRRXQIDYRXUDEO\DIIHFWHG+RZHYHULQ
regard hereto, there may also need to be trade offs. 
But legislative reform will not solve all the problems. The management of our dispute 
resolution institutions and the implementation of policy to build and streamline sectoral 
collective bargaining require urgent attention. Without this, the debate about legislative 
reform may be rendered academic. 
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